The transformation in the AKP’s foreign policy after the 2023 elections and the local election agenda have materialized to an undeniable extent. This transformation is being evaluated in the context of both domestic political dynamics and international relations. It is certain that the AKP is seeking a new alliance in domestic politics and that this Alliance is intended to serve the continuation of Erdogan’s power both internally and externally.
The reasons for AKP’s foreign policy transformation stem from both internal and external factors. Among internal factors are the economic crisis, political polarization, judicial reform, constitutional change, the Kurdish issue, secularism debate, beginning divergence in the People’s Alliance, the rise of opposition parties, increase in social opposition, media pressure, corruption allegations, human rights violations, etc. External factors include deterioration of relations with the US, halt of EU negotiations, distancing from NATO, rapprochement with Russia, civil war in Syria and Libya, tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, the war in the Caucasus, instability in the Middle East, competition with Iran, acceptance of the failure of Egypt and Israel policies, cooperation with Qatar, balancing with China, etc. These factors have made it necessary for AKP to develop a new strategy in foreign policy.
The cabinet formed after the 2023 election is observed to be undergoing a revision in orientation, if not methodologically, in the new process. AKP is not abandoning its utilitarian policy management approach focused on domestic political rent, which leaves Turkey’s foreign policy interests in the background. However, by producing new equations, it is trying to pave the way to 2028 at the cost of paying more than necessary in areas where it is cornered. The answer to AKP’s search for a new alliance in domestic politics necessitates redesigning the current form of the People’s Alliance. The content of this new alliance design may include the establishment of a new political bloc that excludes MHP and includes DEM, DEVA, GP, SP, and YRP; a new constitutional draft that weakens the principle of secularism and restarts the Peace Process; a new foreign policy vision that constructs relations with the West on a conciliatory basis and provides economic support.
The number of members of the aforementioned political parties in the Turkish Grand National Assembly is currently over 360 and constitutes a majority that could design a constitutional amendment referendum. Political and economic support from the West may be sought with the new Alliance that distorts secularism and constitutional provisions based on secularism and promises a more closed Peace Process than the previous one. Thus, the economic crisis agenda can be overcome quickly, and foreign policy tensions with the West can be largely eliminated. In return for these, legal conditions that pave the way for Erdogan to become a candidate again in 2028 can be produced.
The point reached, namely, the integration of economy and foreign policy, was not a matter of choice for AKP and Erdogan. However, this integration means that AKP is also abandoning its extremely flawed economic and foreign policy design that it has been pursuing since 2016. It is also possible to assume that this change process started with specific agreements.
Along with all these materializing possibilities, Erdogan’s policy axis, which he was forced to change, has a five-person foundation. Hakan Fidan, the strongest representative of transatlantic relations between 2016-2023, took over foreign affairs. Ibrahim Kalın, Fidan’s political ally, was appointed head of intelligence. Mehmet Şimşek, who has a vast influence abroad, took over economic management. Defense Minister Yaşar Güler took responsibility for managing relations with alliance member countries, specifically NATO. The task of putting pressure against the Devlet Bahçeli – Süleyman Soylu side, which is positioned as opposed to this team, was given to Ali Yerlikaya. However, these five pillars are unequal; Hakan Fidan and Mehmet Şimşek have greater power and sphere of influence through Erdogan than other actors.
Turkish foreign policy, which has begun to be managed under the coordination of Hakan Fidan and Mehmet Şimşek, has two main goals until 2028:
- Preventing the election agenda from focusing on economic crisis once again.
- Paving the way for Erdogan to become a candidate once more.
At this stage, the new Alliance’s first goal is to organize a constitutional amendment referendum for 2025-2026 after the 2024 elections.
It is possible to follow the clues of the new political transformation that is materializing and becoming more likely to happen from specific events and phenomena. For example, the Swedish government’s publication of a security document defining PKK as an internal terror threat and the Iraqi central government and KRG taking a joint stance with Turkey against PKK in Northern Iraq are not coincidental or independent developments that cannot be evaluated separately. The Somalia – Turkey security agreement, which the US also supports and is likely to be part of, can be evaluated in this framework. The US and Turkey must have a consensus on the Egypt – Ethiopia – Somalia axis, which has become concrete. It is contrary to the natural flow of history to assume that this consensus is limited only to this region. Erdogan may have planned to reconcile with Sisi, act jointly with the US in Somalia, abandon Ethiopia’s Alliance, and, in return, obtain privileges that would ease his hand in domestic politics.
The US figures visiting Turkey in February are also quite noteworthy. The visits of Victoria Nuland, Chris Murphy, and Jeanne Shaheen will have consequences for Turkey’s relations with NATO and its Syria policy. Nuland’s direct public statements about S400 and F35 issues are critical. Turkey’s return to the F35 project would mean re-establishing a strategic partnership with the US. Alignment of macro policies will be a prerequisite. Murphy and Shaheen are among the most important names positioned against Turkish theses due to the differentiation of the US and Turkey’s policies in Northern Syria. Both names define Turkey’s military operations as war crimes against Kurdish civilians.
On the other hand, developments directly concerning Turkey’s stance in the Russia-Ukraine war have also been triggered. A Turkish company has established a 155mm howitzer ammunition production line in Texas. The ammunition produced here will be directly allocated to Ukraine’s needs. According to US laws, the US Department of Defense cannot purchase ammunition not produced in the US. In return for this support given to increase US production capacity, it is evident that the US will also support the production of some military systems. The foreign ministry briefing text published specifically regarding the Blinken and Fidan meeting confirms this thesis.
Russia conducted a flight over Idlib on the morning of February 22 with aircraft loaded with air-to-ground ammunition. In Russia’s official statement about this flight, all the photographs used directly show Turkey’s military bases in Idlib. The sharing of these images is a direct message from Russia to Turkey. The message is quite clear that Turkey’s restoration of relations with the West again and positioning in an anti-Russian position will have a cost in Syria. Additionally, artillery batteries belonging to the Syrian regime have also been deployed in Manbij, which the PYD controls.
Energy privileges granted to Gulf countries, particularly the UAE, are characterized by capitulation. These privileges have both political and economic justifications. Along with the need for rapid and direct investments, discussing an initiative to balance Russia’s presence in Akkuyu is possible. Again, the reference to SMR projects, specifically regarding energy security in the Blinken and Fidan meeting, concretizes a search for balance.
In light of the mentioned and unmentioned other political developments, Erdogan has begun to align with the West on topics related to Syria, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Preparations are being made for internal and foreign policy changes requested from Turkey within a specific timeline. Turkey’s tendency to reduce its distance from Russia after 2016 will follow a reverse course. Turkey’s foreign military purchases and sharing standard security policies with Europe will continue. The West suggests that Greece not take steps that would increase tension in this process. Greece’s policies by these suggestions are being met with reaction from the Greek Cypriot administration. The US has re-declared, albeit in a low tone, that it does not support Greece’s airspace theses in the Aegean.
Within 2024, BAYKAR will put its factory in Ukraine into service and meet Ukraine’s UAV/UCAV needs. Some EU member countries, particularly France, plan to prevent the purchase from Turkish companies with funds they have allocated for Ukraine; however, the applicability of this covert embargo in practice is debatable.
To start a new anti-Assad process in Syria, it may be possible for Erdogan to redefine the PYD. To convince the public of this definition change, PKK’s existence could be effectively eliminated with the support of Iraq, KRG, and the US. If Erdogan can declare that PKK has been eliminated, he can redesign the PYD issue in domestic politics and explain it to his voters.
Turkey’s alignment with the West regarding Ukraine and Syria will be rewarded economically. However, the release of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala will also be questioned. This atmosphere and the political rent it creates will make it possible to obtain the necessary internal and external support for a constitutional amendment.
The picture that the opposition may face for 2028 will be very different from 2023: against a government that has overcome the economic crisis, primarily solved foreign policy problems, and consolidated its Alliance with a new constitution; a picture of a deformed and largely institutionally lost nationalist/idealist bloc and a Republican People’s Party with narrowed institutional alliance area is not far from us.
