History, in its own winding way, sometimes finds a path to fulfill its vision. During World War I, Friedrich Naumann’s “Mitteleuropa” vision may not have materialized under the conditions of its time, but today, it has taken on a different form under the umbrella of the European Union. Particularly in Central Europe, German economic and political influence appears remarkably similar to what was envisioned a century ago.
Naumann’s project was essentially an effort to institutionalize Germany’s natural economic power within a structured framework. Today, when we look at Germany’s position within the EU, we see that this institutional framework has materialized in a different form but with a similar function. The Eurozone essentially operates as a German economic area. From central bank policies to fiscal discipline rules, many fundamental economic parameters are shaped according to the requirements of the German economic model.
In his 1915 book “Mitteleuropa,” Naumann envisioned an economic zone based on a customs union and a common currency centered around Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire following a German victory in World War I. This structure included a hierarchical economic order where new states in Eastern Europe and other European countries would be dependent on Germany. Today, the Eurozone and the EU’s enlargement process have created a similar hierarchical structure through different means.
The situation in Central Europe particularly resembles the realization of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa vision. The economies of the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) are almost entirely integrated into the German industrial supply chain. Their automotive, machinery, and electronics industries largely function as extensions of the German manufacturing base.
The 2004 EU enlargement marked a turning point in institutionalizing a modern version of Mitteleuropa. With this enlargement wave, Central European countries formally integrated into the German economic sphere. Structural and cohesion funds provided by the EU financed this integration, while direct investments by German companies reinforced economic dependence.
The Visegrad Group’s cooperation platform may initially seem like a balancing factor against German influence. However, upon closer examination, this cooperation also aligns with German economic interests. For instance, their common positions within the EU often coincide with Germany’s preferred policy direction. Even divergences in migration policy do not contradict the labor needs of German industry.
German direct investments in Central Europe have turned the region into an “extended workbench.” Volkswagen’s operations with Skoda in the Czech Republic, Audi’s facilities in Hungary, and numerous investments by medium-sized German companies in Poland are concrete examples of this economic integration. This structure can be read as a modern version of the center-periphery relationship envisioned in Mitteleuropa.
As of 2021, approximately 30% of the total foreign trade of Visegrad countries is with Germany. Depending on the sector, the share of German companies in foreign direct investment ranges between 20% and 50%. This percentage is much higher in the automotive sector, where over 60% of the vehicles produced in the Czech Republic are for German brands.
The relationship between EU funds received by Visegrad countries and German investments in the region is also noteworthy. Of the approximately 150 billion euros allocated to these countries between 2014 and 2020, a significant portion was directed toward infrastructure and industrial projects, indirectly supporting German operations in the region.
The structure that became more pronounced after the 2008 financial crisis has further consolidated with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. The importance of Central Europe for German industry has increased even more during the restructuring of supply chains. Discussions on “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring” have paradoxically led to greater integration of the region into the German economic sphere.
The processes of digital transformation and transition to a green economy also deepen this integration. Under the green transition program announced by the German government in 2021, significant investments are planned to modernize supply chains in Central Europe. Particularly in the fields of electric vehicle production and battery technology, the region is becoming a critical hub for German industry.
The political consequences of this economic integration also parallel the Mitteleuropa vision. The positions of Visegrad countries within the EU often align with Germany’s interests. For example, in EU policy toward China, these countries take positions that align with the interests of German industry. Even divergences in policies toward Russia ultimately reflect Germany’s concerns about energy security.
The social dimension of this economic integration is equally striking. Labor migration from Central Europe to Germany constitutes another aspect of mutual dependency. As of 2021, the number of Polish workers in Germany has exceeded 860,000, representing a modern version of the labor mobility envisioned by Naumann.
Within the EU’s institutional framework, France’s political weight and the presence of other member states prevent an open German hegemony of the type envisioned in Mitteleuropa. However, economic realities, particularly in Central Europe, have created a structure reminiscent of Naumann’s vision.
The sustainability of this structure largely depends on the performance of the German economy and the stability of the EU’s institutional framework. The ongoing processes of green transition and digitalization could further deepen the current model of economic integration. Germany’s success in this transformation will likely enhance its influence over Central Europe.
On the other hand, the dependency relationship created by this economic integration is not one-sided. The German economy is also becoming increasingly dependent on production networks and labor in Central Europe. This mutual dependency serves as a significant guarantee for the sustainability of the relationship.
In conclusion, the Mitteleuropa vision appears to have materialized under the EU framework in a much more sophisticated form. Particularly in Central Europe, economic integration is deepening in line with German interests. The cooperation among Visegrad countries supports this structure. The irony of history is that a project that could not be realized through war has come to life through peace and economic integration. This serves as a striking example of how economic realities eventually find their path.
