What Did Hamas Achieve?

It is beneficial to state a point about this article’s subject from the start. The realities defined as Hamas’s successes are not praise for Hamas; they are interpretations made based on observations and data. In this context, no sympathy has been shown to any side responsible for the deaths of Palestinian and Israeli civilians. The definitions of terrorism and war crimes are quite clear, and the actions of the parties and the definitions of these actions are fixed. Hamas is a terrorist organization, and Israel is committing war crimes. There is no moral or legal hierarchy between war crimes and terrorist acts.

We will never know what Hamas targeted in its October 7 attack. However, there’s no harm in saying that it achieved a result far beyond what it targeted. As a result of this attack, the paradigms we knew and accepted in the Middle East largely lost their validity as of October 7. We have entered a period where the world will no longer be the same, but we don’t yet know what awaits us in the new world.

Israel’s Deterrence Has Become Questionable

Israel, as a credible and sovereign state, is one of the strongest states in the Middle East according to certain parameters. It has undisputable economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities. Despite having a small population, it has quite a large economy, and this growth trend continues despite everything.

Israel has strong and reciprocal diplomatic relations with every pole in the world. Although its relations with its neighbors have progressed through conflictual dynamics since its establishment, it simultaneously has good relations with the Western world, China, and Russia. Militarily, Israel has an extremely capable land force and an air force with much higher capability. Meanwhile, Israel also continues strengthening its naval forces, granting it new capabilities.

Israel has prevented the materialization of attacks by its adversaries for decades thanks to these capabilities. In this sense, without declaring mobilization, it has been able to protect its country and citizens from interstate attacks through its available means. Meanwhile Israel’s understanding of security is shaped by intelligence organizations. The functions and capabilities of these institutions are also globally perceived to be respected and effective.

When we consider all these contexts, Hamas’s successful attack has made Israel’s security policies, security bureaucracy, and their sum of deterrence questionable. When a sovereign country’s deterrence becomes questionable, an “epidemic disease” emerges, and risks begin to emerge for other sovereign states as well.

Regional countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, which have been in effective conflict with armed non-state formations for many years, may see their adversaries copying Hamas’s methods. Moreover, groups dissatisfied with any country’s any policy and attitude can gain capacities to produce threats with technically accessible equipment for sovereign states anywhere in the world.

The mercenaries of paid security companies like Wagner, whose leadership has died/been killed, spread worldwide, can dramatically increase the abilities and capacities of such non-state armed groups.

Israel Lost Strategically for the First Time in Its History

While the Abraham Accords process aimed to start a permanent peace and cooperation process between regional countries, the actual goal of this agreement was to normalize Israel’s relations with hostile countries. In the past few years, many Middle Eastern countries could come together despite past harsh conflict climates based on this agreement. Many summits were held to establish political and economic partnerships. Concrete outputs of this entire process came before the public. Moreover, the new trade route to be opened from India to Europe, whose main lines were announced at the last G20 summit, was built on this normalization ground.

All this positive and conciliatory climate disappeared with Hamas’s attack. Commercial cooperations expected to have trillion-dollar volume, energy corridors, and permanent peace negotiations were shelved. Undoubtedly, the reactions of the societies of regional countries regarding the Hamas attack and the subsequent picture were decisive. However, there’s no harm in saying that the Arab Spring experience is at the basis of taking these reactions seriously by the dynasties in the Middle East. Images of radicalized societies overthrowing very powerful rulers who had ruled for decades are still fresh, and no one is inclined to take such risks.

In the process after Hamas’s attack –this article was written 23 days after the attack– Israel’s response was limited to tightening the Gaza blockade and conducting air operations. However, Israel hasn’t been able to do anything new or different with these steps. The blockade has been continuing for 16 years, and in recent years, although the numbers vary, the security of Palestinian civilians is ignored by Israel. There is no contraction yet in Hamas’s capacity and sphere of influence.

Exposed the Weaknesses and Erosion of Israel’s Security Bureaucracy

The Netanyahu government’s way of perceiving political    power is based on dominating politics and completely controlling bureaucracy. The judicial reform that occupied Israel’s domestic political agenda last summer was also part of this. Netanyahu, who saw the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances mechanisms as obstacles to be removed from the path of his power, weakened Israel’s institutional reflexes in the process.

Particularly the Israeli security bureaucracy’s considerable inadequacy in preventing and responding to October 7 also provided ground for the spread of the idea that perceptions about Israel’s military capacity are a myth. In addition to all these, we should keep in mind that the main duty of any country’s entire security bureaucracy in times of peace is to prepare for such scenarios. Of course, while every institution has a margin for making mistakes and being inadequate, Israel’s very long response time also indicates the existence of a more chronic and structural problem.

At this point, it’s necessary to rethink the risks that will arise regarding Israel’s deterrence and remind that the danger does not only arise for Israel; governments with similar political tendencies expose their own countries to similar risks.

Took Over Palestinian Leadership

The Muslim Brotherhood line where Hamas ideologically positions itself had almost completely lost its political support with the Abraham Accords process. It had lost important positions in its competition with other Sunni-Islamic organizations and powers. Therefore, Fatah, which had legal power in the remaining enclaves from the West Bank, was seen as the sole legitimate representative of Palestine.

Iran’s claim of patronage of the Palestinian Cause, which wanted to design a different sphere of influence, also found support under the leadership of organizations like Hezbollah. The competition brought by this protection claim indicated a separation at the level of armed conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran in Syria and Iraq. Islamic Jihad, in this context, was operating in Gaza as an extension of Iran’s ideological line.

On October 7, we witnessed Hamas gathering all armed and unarmed organizations in Gaza under a single headquarters roof and managing a joint offensive. Not only Islamic Jihad but also left-secular organizations, although their contributions and influence were limited, were included in this HQ.

Looking at the picture that emerged as a result of this entire process, we can say that Hamas’s military quality is more prominent; the leadership of the conflictual wing with Israel has been implicitly accepted. Moreover, it is possible to observe that it has convinced Palestinian society that continuing negotiations with Israel will have no political return.

Strengthened BRICS Expansion

Important power centers of the region like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, which will become BRICS members as of January 1, 2024, had designed to maintain their political relations in balance with the West through the Abraham Accords and with the East as BRICS stakeholders. However, as a result of the period that started approximately 3 weeks ago, we see that only BRICS’s sphere of influence remains while Abraham Accords are now void.

Considering that the already weak emotional bond with the West in societies in the region is completely lost due to Israel’s military operation style being inexplicable in dimensions, it won’t be difficult for the BRICS line to produce more social consent. The fact that BRICS leadership and parties do not engage in any initiatives-actions that will lose diplomatic ground will allow the political course to progress in their favor. It is also necessary to note the moderate approaches of energy-exporting countries towards the West.