Can Turkey’s TFX MMU KAAN Groject Compete Globally?

Let us state at the very beginning what needs to be said at the end: Turkey will complete this project; in the foreseeable future, it has no other choice but to complete it. The justifications for this necessity would be the subject of a separate article. The economic crisis Turkey has been in for some time, along with the negative effects of the diplomatic conjuncture, has pushed Turkey into a position from which it is difficult to turn back. Naturally, Turkey meeting its military needs through its own means is a positive development. However, in this process, Turkey may have to compromise its potential to compensate for vulnerabilities it might experience; this is the core of the projection observed with "concern" in this article.

TUSAŞ KAAN, known by its project name National Combat Aircraft (MMU), was announced to the public in December 2010 following a meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee. Developed by TUSAŞ and planned to reach the mass production stage toward the end of the 2020s, it is a 5th-generation jet combat aircraft project featuring twin engines, low visibility (stealth), sensor fusion, and superior air-to-air and air-to-ground dominance capabilities.

From F-35 Partner to Sole Project

The design goal of the MMU was originally to compensate for the air-to-air combat gaps of the F-35 project, of which Turkey was a partner at the time. However, following the sanctions process that began after Turkey purchased the S-400 Air Defense System from Russia, Turkey was completely removed from the F-35 program where it served as a manufacturer. Consequently, the MMU project remained Turkey's only 5th-generation fighter aircraft project.

The MMU was planned to have 5th-generation low visibility and advanced avionics to perform joint operations with the F-35 aircraft intended for the inventory at that time and to be suitable for the future battlefield. The original role of the MMU was actually to support F-35 aircraft and to close the gap—domestically and more affordably—that would be created by the future retirement of F-16 type fighter jets. Additionally, it aimed to acquire capabilities not currently held in the existing inventory.

Chief among these capabilities is the achievement of a new operational concept through the acquisition of F-35s, MMUs, and the S/UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) that will maneuver alongside these platforms. An air force adapted to this concept will also possess the appropriate infrastructure for 6th-generation platforms.

Increasing Urgency and Technical Shifts

However, our removal from the F-35 project in 2019 and the fact that our F-4 fighter jets are significantly worn out (recently, an F-4's external fuel tank fell onto civilian residential areas for an undisclosed reason, fortunately without injury or loss of life) have increased the importance of the MMU project. While the National Combat Aircraft is now expected to possess higher technology, the urgency of delivering the aircraft to the Turkish Air Force has also intensified.

With these developments, the "deep strike" capability—the task of crossing enemy borders undetected by radars to destroy strategic and tactical targets—which was normally to be undertaken by F-35s, has also fallen onto the shoulders of the MMU. Furthermore, the MMU must now fill the void left not only by the F-16s but also by the F-4 aircraft, which generally undertake the bombardment of internal and cross-border terror targets and can carry a higher combat load and air-to-ground ammunition compared to F-16s. Therefore, we can say that the selection of the twin-engine FX-1 TFX configuration in the 2015 evaluations, though more costly, was a great stroke of luck for Turkey and its defense industry. Twin-engine aircraft are generally safer, can take off with heavier loads, and have a wider operational radius compared to their single-engine counterparts (FX-5 and FX-6). Those who remember the exercises and operations conducted by our F-16s in Libya in 2020 with tanker aircraft support are aware of how vital the operational radius is.

Manufacturing and Engine Challenges

For the MMU to possess the announced capabilities, there are obstacles related to manufacturing technology in the production of structural parts. Unfortunately, Turkey does not possess the manufacturing capabilities required for the production of the MMU's structural components, and it has been announced that a production technique suitable for alternative methods will be used. The fact that countries possessing these manufacturing capabilities will not or cannot provide support to Turkey—due to both political reasons and their own full production lines—is undoubtedly the sole reason for this necessity.

Another issue concerns engines and power units, where a problem similar to that of structural parts exists. In a speech in 2020, Temel Kotil explained that the titanium press technology required for the MMU's engines is not available in Turkey, and therefore, it would be produced under vacuum using innovative 3D printing methods. As of today, this 3D production technology exists only in China, Germany, the USA, and Turkey. In fact, TUSAŞ is carrying out more than 10 projects with subcontractors to support this manufacturing technology. This project management, which we haven't seen traces of for a long time, is quite positive as it aims for R&D outputs produced for military technologies to support the civilian industry.

Furthermore, due to technical, economic, and political reasons that make the procurement or production of materials necessary for some parts of the domestic engine impossible for Turkey, it is estimated that the domestic engine will be heavier than designed. This situation could negatively affect the operational radius and the flight capabilities of the MMU.

The Roadmap: Block Production

Due to the resulting urgency and need, it has been decided to use block-type production to accelerate the manufacturing of the National Combat Aircraft. In this way, the Faz-1 and Faz-2 blocks of the TFX, which are less advanced and not considered fully 5th generation, are expected to be delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces by 2030. After 2030, the Faz-3 model, which can be called fully 5th generation and will have a domestic engine, is planned to be produced and delivered. The endurance capabilities of the platforms in the initial phases will be limited compared to later phases. The risk here relates to the possibility of the first phases being short-lived, similar to Russian platforms. Such results could lead to a negative perception regarding the project's future. Therefore, conducting public campaigns to maintain transparency regarding these aspects of the phases could weaken potential political objections later on.

The prototype and the first mass-produced aircraft are planned to be powered by GE F110 engines produced by US-based General Electric. This engine currently powers the Turkish F-16 fleet and is a motor that TUSAŞ and TEI, the main contractors of the MMU, are very familiar with. Future phases are intended to be powered by a domestically produced engine. There are several options for this engine: the first is the Kale Group and Rolls Royce partnership (based on the EJ200 engine powering the Eurofighter), and the second is an engine to be developed by TEI based on its own TEI-TF10000 engine in partnership with TRMotor.

Timeline and Geopolitical Context

The production process of the National Combat Aircraft has accelerated significantly. While it was previously discussed that the aircraft's first taxi, ground tests, and first flight would take place in the second half of the 2020s, the program was moved forward through the devoted work of TUSAŞ and other domestic contractors; the MMU made its first taxi in March 2023. TUSAŞ General Manager Temel Kotil announced that the MMU, whose ground tests are ongoing, would make its first flight on December 23, 2023.

Regarding the risks mentioned above: it is evident that to overcome the lack of technology in production, there must be a shift toward additive manufacturing technologies; current production techniques will not meet future industrial designs and requirements. However, for a manufacturer with limited resources and means like Turkey, adapting such a manufacturing technology will take time. Turkey needs to produce "time" along with these projects to acquire these capabilities. This is where the technical dimension of the issue ends and the political dimension begins.

While continuing the KAAN project, our domestic F-16 modernization project ÖZGÜR and our request to the US for F-16 Block 70 modernization and "ready-purchase" are also very important. In light of this information, we can say that the Turkish Armed Forces have entered a path to rapidly renew the inventory in their hands and that planning is being done to ensure no loss of operational capability. Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to speak of data suggesting that economic and political obstacles for the Viper modernization and new purchases have been removed.

Conclusion: Diplomacy and Time

The speed of development in today's technologies in every field creates burdens that a single country, including the US and China, cannot handle alone. The fact that the primary element of competition has become based on qualified human resources allows even countries with very low populations and small sizes to be dominant in certain areas. At the same time, military expenditures with no commercial return, "maintained standing armies," and equipment become a massive economic burden. The design and projection phase of the next generation of almost every platform begins before the current platform even enters mass production. Without straying from the main topic, it must also be noted that this rate of armament is quite alarming.

The KAAN project strongly tests Turkey's economic, technical, and political capacity. The deepening crisis in the Turkish economy presents Turkey with a more difficult and arduous test. On the other hand, solving the technical problems mentioned above is becoming harder by the day for our country, which is experiencing an intense brain drain of qualified human resources.

Furthermore, countries in our region are not exempt from this arms race, and we must admit that they are managing to arm themselves faster than Turkey. Accepting Clausewitz's definition that "war is a part of diplomatic processes," we must prepare for future macro processes. As Israel gains new capabilities every day and Egypt and Greece easily pass "market orders," the military deterrence of our standing in the region diminishes. If we do not face this reality without denying the things we have done right, we may find ourselves forced to negotiate even our most natural rights.

Turkey needs time due to the political and economic crises it is in. We must quickly remove this factor—which we lack but our counterparts have in abundance—from being a negative agenda for our country. In this sense, our primary goal should be to operate a concrete timeline of gains that is cool-headed and far from emotionalism. Prioritizing negotiation over debate and conflict in diplomacy can gain us the time we need most. The inventory of what we need and what we do not need is clear; it is essential to start by moving away from internal political rent-seeking goals.

In the eyes of history, the reason that made Mustafa Kemal successful and Enver unsuccessful is precisely related to this perspective. History is full of exemplary lessons; if we know how to take them, we can survive the age of chaos and crisis without damage.