Within the next 6 years, Greece will have the capability to strike critical facilities and infrastructure elements such as Tüpraş and Aliağa refineries; Gölcük and Aksaz naval bases, Arifiye 1st Main Maintenance Factory Directorate; and the Çanakkale, Osmangazi, July 15, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, and Yavuz Sultan Selim bridges by the 8th hour of a potential conflict.
While Israel cannot conduct such operations due to geographical distances, it possesses an unrivaled air force from Italy to China thanks to the capabilities of its aircraft. Currently, Turkey’s airspace is also strongly threatened from the east by Iran’s SU-35s acquired from Russia. Even Saudi Arabia, which imports pilots from Pakistan to fly its air force inventory, has acquired a larger fleet than the Turkish Air Force.
In Turkish time, early morning on January 27th, Biden sent the notification letter to Congress regarding significant arms sales to Turkey and Greece. Since both Turkey and Greece are NATO member countries, if Congress doesn’t pass legislation blocking these sales within 15 days, the Pentagon and Ministry of National Defense will proceed with negotiating the technical details of the sale, having passed the legal phase. The Presidency of Defense Industries cannot officially participate in the negotiation phase as it is currently subject to CAATSA sanctions.
According to the law in effect in the US since 1976, while Congress has the authority to block the sale or impose conditions on its content, such legislation has never been passed in any military sale process in nearly 50 years. The US has exported weapons worth 900 billion USD in the last 20 years and has sold weapons to at least one party, often all parties, in 2/3 of all war-conflict zones worldwide in the last 6 years. In summary, it is highly unlikely that the US Congress will issue a decision blocking this sale. The simultaneous F-35 sale to Greece has already greatly pleased the Hellenic lobby (HALC) representatives in Congress. While the Armenian lobby (ANCA) might make an attempt, they won’t be able to reach sufficient numbers. These lobbies are also supported by the Indian (Hindu American Foundation), Kurdish (American Friends of Kurdistan), and In Defense of Christians lobbies.
The most likely risk that could emerge for the F-16 and modernization package sale to Turkey could arise with Donald Trump’s election as president in 2024. Trump had made and implemented the decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program during his first term. Trump, who subjected Turkey to CAATSA sanctions due to the S400 air defense systems purchased from Russia following Erdogan’s decision, could halt the F-16 and modernization package sales due to Erdogan’s unstable and variable policies in the Middle East, Palestine, and Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, by 2040, the Turkish Air Force might not have any modern combat aircraft to operate if the 40 new aircraft and 79 modernization kits, along with all ammunition and attachments for these aircraft, are not completely delivered. While modernization kits could be delivered earlier, the earliest delivery date for new F-16s would be 2029.
So how did Greece technically gain air superiority?
How can it produce such threats?
Turkey will have a total of 119 latest version F-16s with the new aircraft and modernization kits it will receive. These aircraft are known publicly as F-16 B70 VIPER. All remaining F-16s in our inventory will also undergo the ÖZGÜR modernization program under ASELSAN’s main contractorship. ÖZGÜR aims to achieve capabilities equivalent to the B70 VIPER. Our aircraft in B70 VIPER versions won’t be able to use our domestic ammunition. A significant portion of the 23 billion USD purchase will be for substantial ammunition acquisition for this reason. F-16s modernized with ÖZGÜR will be able to use domestic ammunition. When all modernization projects are completed, the F-16s in our fleet will have very powerful and capable AESA type radars. These radars, which are among the most important components for all combat aircraft, will have extremely modern capabilities. However, even though F-16s will have AESA radars, they will be more visibly detectable from longer distances on radar.
Looking at the list of our purchases from the US, the reason for acquiring ammunition that would fully equip all B70 VIPER version aircraft for exactly 2 sorties to threaten beyond-visual-range targets can be explained for this reason. However, Greece will have both advanced AESA type radars and unmatched sensors with the F-35s it will purchase. Moreover, the AESA type radars that our F-16s will use won’t be able to detect Greece’s F-35s in the safe zone. Greek F-35s will be able to detect Turkish F-16s and perform 2 shots. Turkish F-16s won’t even be able to detect the Greek F-35s that have performed 2 shots against them. On the other hand, Greek F-35s will be supported by French-made Rafales. Rafales are also aircraft that are more difficult to detect on radar than Turkish F-16s. Moreover, these Rafales can use Meteor missiles, which have longer range than all air-to-air ammunition used by the F-35. Although Greece doesn’t have such capability, if it could send any air picture to its Rafales, its Rafale aircraft on its own shores could threaten Turkish F-16s in Izmir. Of course, there’s no obstacle preventing them from acquiring such capabilities over time. The F-35 will support not only Greek air forces but also land forces and navy. Greek F-35s can threaten all elements they detect with friendly air defense and naval missiles thanks to their sensors and radars. Greece doesn’t have this capability yet, but there is already a datalink study on this subject, and it will acquire this capability when it starts receiving F-35s.
Another detail concerns the F-35’s pilot helmets; with the F-35, pilots use a helmet that produces very high situational awareness capacity and provides an advantage even in within-visual-range situations against F-16 pilots. That is, contrary to common belief, F-35s will be able to provide advantages against F-16s even in close combat scenarios known as dogfights. Setting aside all data and comparisons, Greece already has F-16 B70 VIPER version aircraft and is modernizing its old version F-16s. In other words, Greece currently possesses and actively uses the aircraft that Turkey will have in the near future.
As stated at the beginning of the article, in a concrete conflict, Greek air forces equipped with F-35s can both shoot down Turkish F-16s and bomb strategically important points within Turkey. None of our air defense systems, including S400, has the capability to prevent this situation. Even if we exclude a long-term war scenario, Greece can inflict damage to Turkey in a short-term conflict that would take years to recover from. It might be impossible to recover from the damage to the Turkish economy. It should also be noted that Romania, among the countries in our region, is currently waiting to receive its F-35 orders. In this case, Turkey’s position within NATO will also be significantly weakened. Tomorrow, it might not even be possible to have the diplomatic leverage that yields no gains today. The limits of military measures Turkey can take against Greece’s 12-mile continental shelf claim, which Turkey considers a cause for war, have narrowed.
Turkey submitted its request for new F-16s and modernization kits to the US 2.5 years ago but didn’t receive a response for quite a long time. Greece, however, received a positive response to its F-35 request within 6 months. Diplomatically, Greece offered nothing in return for this purchase and was able to achieve a major gain. Turkey, on the other hand, gained nothing for its approval of NATO expansion. It hasn’t resolved its political disagreements with the US. Greece kept Macedonia’s NATO membership waiting for 11 years and gave approval after its demands were met. However, Turkey hasn’t achieved similar success. In fact, there is no relationship between the F-16 sale and approval of Sweden’s NATO membership. Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership requests came to the agenda much later than Turkey’s F-16 and modernization kit request. Turkey expressed its F-16 and modernization kit request as a solution to offset its receivables related to the F-35 project. Turkey has neither been able to object to Greece making a purchase that will advance all its military platforms by a generation, in exchange for a purchase that won’t create a major breakthrough or provide generational advantage, nor has it been able to operate a process in its favor regarding NATO expansion. In addition to the notification sent to Congress on January 27th, the US is also donating to Greece under the EDA program: 3 patrol ships, 4 corvettes, 2 transport aircraft, dozens of trucks, and dozens of armored vehicles. It is announced that there will be a US aid of 200 million USD in return for Greece’s obsolete weapons to be sent to Ukraine. The way is being paved for the sale of modern military cargo aircraft and refueling aircraft to Greece in the near future. This way, Greece can gain the ability to conduct air operations up to Cyprus; currently, Greece doesn’t have such capacity.
On the other hand, the expressions used in the press release announced by the US regarding the situation of the Turkish Air Force are also important. It was implicitly stated that the Turkish Air Force will face the danger of losing a very large capability in the foreseeable future. The statement about the current fleet reaching the end of its life is particularly noteworthy. The AKP government has failed to renew the fleet it inherited, and the number of combat jets has decreased by more than 30% during this period. A unit losing more than 30% of its assets means it has become militarily ineffective. Therefore, structural parts that will extend the airframe life of F-16s have also been included in the sales agreement. Another noteworthy part of the agreement is that spares of some subsystems have been purchased in excess. These parts are likely to be used in the MMU KAAN project, but it’s not possible to know whether an agreement has been made regarding this matter. If these parts are used in MMU KAAN despite not being in the agreement, the US could impose a new embargo. Given the emerging picture, it would be in Turkey’s favor for diplomats and bureaucrats, whose competencies and capacities have become questionable, to understand this issue and open negotiation headings in this context.
The MMU KAAN project is currently Turkey’s largest and most strategic industrial project. Despite having the capacity to enable our industrial transformation, not just in terms of military qualities, this potential is not being utilized by the government. MMU KAAN is also being treated as an object for political rent-seeking. There are parties within the government coalition who are hostile to the MMU KAAN project and these parties advocate the idea that investment should only be made in unmanned jet aircraft. Since it’s being used as a political rent-seeking object, the public is being misled with unrealistic information. Government propagandists frequently announce that MMU KAAN, which is declared to have superior qualities to the F-35, will enter serial production in the 2030s. The question “If we can put an aircraft superior to the F-35 into serial production at these dates, and if we can modernize our F-16s with the ÖZGÜR modernization project, why are we spending tens of billions of dollars of public budget on such purchases?” stands before us. The public is being manipulated specifically for elections. In return for this manipulation, our country’s security is being endangered. These representatives who openly spread false propaganda are causing great harm to our country and our future.
These propaganda representatives, who had no opposition to the F-35 project until Turkey’s removal from it, are also manipulating society on another issue. Technical explanations and unfounded lies about the F-35 project have been intensively circulated. The F-35 is the combat aircraft with the lowest accident-crash rate ever produced, possessing the most advanced technologies, and the most difficult to develop countermeasures against. Its combat readiness average is much higher compared to lower generation aircraft. The US has accepted the requests of the United Kingdom, Italy, and Israel for access to F-35’s software sources. It does not reject requests in this direction. On the other hand, all risks based on US obstacles to Turkey’s conducting air operations with F-35s are also valid for F-16s. Even the interruption of spare parts supplied from the US would be sufficient for such a scenario. In other words, the arguments about becoming dependent on the US through the F-35 can also be used for F-16s. Ultimately, if you’re not manufacturing your combat aircraft from top to bottom yourself, you can use imported aircraft within the framework of an agreement you’ll make with the producing country.
Turkey’s financial gain as an F-35 project partner would have been more than the amount it would spend to purchase the aircraft.
Such an advantage has not been possible for any project partner. Turkey was able to obtain this advantage in NATO’s 1999 expansion. In the same expansion, Turkey also stipulated the surrender of PKK terrorist organization’s so-called leader Abdullah Öcalan. If we were to adapt this to today, for the AKP government to achieve similar success, it would need to secure both partnership in the 6th generation fighter aircraft project and the extradition of Fethullah Gülen.
Government propagandists persistently ignore all these facts and phenomena. While Turkey’s removal from the F-35 project could be a situation as favorable as one that could happen in dreams for any adversary and rival country, Turkey suffered this financial loss at the hands of AKP. The acquired S400 air defense systems have neither been able to be integrated into our radar system nor provided capabilities to eliminate threats to our airspace. Systems that should monitor potential violations and threats on a 24/7 basis are waiting in storage. The amount of missiles used with the S400 is limited; even if the system were to be used, there would be no missiles in stock to use after the first 24 hours of an actual war.
After the US press bulletins for Turkey and Greece, another matter of discussion has been about the cost of the sales. This sale, announced to cost Turkey 23 billion USD, could be made at a lower price. The final price will emerge when final negotiations are completed. However, it’s clear that ammunition, pods, and other attachments in addition to 40 new aircraft and 79 modernization kits will constitute a significant cost. Still, it’s not possible and reasonable for this cost to be 23 billion USD. Spending this amount of resources for these systems is not rational either. In the bulletin announced for Greece, ammunition that F-35s can use is not included in the list. Of course, necessary ammunition can be obtained more easily as the delivery date approaches, but the sales price without ammunition is quite high for Greece as well. It’s certain that they will also reduce the purchase price in the final negotiation.
In summary, Turkey has faced major security threat vulnerabilities in a process where it could/should have achieved diplomatic gains. Its military deterrence will become questionable in the near future. The Turkish Air Force, which was the strongest, most qualified, most ready, most experienced, and most deterrent among regional air forces including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and of course Greece until 10 years ago, has fallen behind in competition. Greece will have absolute air dominance in the Aegean in the next 10 years. If Turkish foreign policy continues to be managed in its current form, Greece will have capabilities to impose its theses through military means as well in the next 20 years.
