In Idlib, Kabul, rural Mali and southern Somalia, groups once associated with al-Qaeda now perform core state tasks: checkpoints, permits, taxation and courts. In Syria, a leadership that once operated under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) now leads a post-HTS transitional government in Damascus, drawing on its earlier governance experience in Idlib while attempting to distance itself from the group’s former militant label. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, long seen as the senior movement that once sheltered al-Qaeda, now functions as the country’s governing authority. Across the Sahel, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) exerts economic pressure on Mali’s fragile capital, disrupting supplies and exposing state weakness. In Somalia, al-Shabaab operates a parallel fiscal and judicial system that competes with official structures. Together, these cases suggest a shift from transnational jihad toward more localized attempts at governance, where ideological ambition coexists with pragmatic rule-building.
In the 2000s al-Qaeda functioned primarily as a hub for global jihad rahter than governance; two decades on, successors invest in territory, order and pragmatic coexistence with states, regional powers and aid agencies. This change represents adaptation rather than straightforward moderation. It stems from enduring state collapse, corruption, the withdrawal or failure of foreign interventions, and local demand for predictable security where formal institutions have disintegrated. The result is a landscape of hybrid authorities in which rule by non-state actors has become a structural, not temporary, feature of political life.
In post-Assad Syria, political authority is now concentrated in a leadership that consolidated itself in Idlib under HTS and relocated to Damascus after the regime’s fall. The transitional government retains Idlib-era cadres and runs ministries, a reconstituted parliament and unified security forces, though local actors (from Druze and Bedouin groups to the Syrian Democratic Forces and coastal militias) constrain effective central control. The “Idlib model” of centralized fiscal management and negotiated engagement with international actors therefore remains influential.
This transformation is the result of a deliberate evolution. HTS, once Jabhat al-Nusra, rebranded itself as a Syrian movement emphasizing national sovereignty and distancing itself from transnational jihadism. After consolidating power in Idlib, it entered the national transition with a unified command and a cadre of technocrats experienced in administration. Since the move to Damascus, the interim authorities have sought to broaden their social base. Parliamentary elections, while not fully competitive, introduced minority representation, and the cabinet includes figures from outside the Islamist core. These gestures, and partial sanctions adjustments, aim to project a pragmatic image, even as persistent human-rights concerns and HTS’s militant legacy constrain legitimacy.
The government’s control of revenue and security remains firm but contested. Institutions led by figures from the former HTS apparatus manage customs, fuel trade, and taxation, while courts apply a hybrid mix of Islamic and civil law. Education and media remain tightly supervised, even as time-limited waivers and modified listings enable limited aid coordination. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s recent UN address and participation in COP 30 signal a calculated bid for legitimacy, though skepticism persists as restrictions remain and recent UNSC resolutions passed with notable abstentions, including China.
In Mali, JNIM has evolved from attacking remote garrisons to exerting sustained economic pressure on Bamako. Since September 2025, its strikes on fuel convoys have caused shortages and school closures, forcing the government to seek alternative supply routes. Analysts remain divided over JNIM’s ultimate goal. Some see calibrated attrition intended to force dialogue, while others note that the group openly cites Taliban as model and draws limited local symphathy amid deep frustration with the state. Years of coups, the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, and reliance on Russian Africa Corps forces have eroded public trust. JNIM now pairs military pressure with outreach to religious figures such as Mahmoud Dicko, using negotiation and coercion in tandem to shape the political balance in Bamako.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab operates as a long-standing shadow state across much of the south and centre. It maintains a taxation network, runs courts considered by some traders to be more predictable than official ones, and enforces an austere regulatory order. Many businesses comply with its levies for reasons of efficiency and safety, and the relative predictability of its courts, though enforcement still relies partly on fear. Without controlling Mogadishu, al-Shabaab performs core state functions such as taxation, justice, and local security, creating a contested perception of functional legitimacy among some residents, though primarily enforced through coercion and fear.
Yemen provides a cautionary illustration. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has alternated between expansion and retreat, briefly ruling Mukalla in 2015 and 2016 with rudimentary administration before being expelled. Its losses since 2020 have fragmented the organization, which now operates as a weakened insurgency in Hadramawt and Marib. Yemen’s example highlights the fragility of such governance models under sustained external and local pressure, showing how quickly militant administrations can collapse once isolated from resources and tribal alliances.
These trajectories point to three broader conclusions. First, counterterrorism policy remains misaligned with reality. Frameworks designed for clandestine networks are being applied to actors operating courts, security forces, and tax systems. Sanctions and designations constrain resources but do not address governance dilemmas. Second, the core problem lies in the complex interplay of deep governance deficits and persistent jihadist ideology. From Syria’s transition to Mali’s turmoil, these groups advanced where state authority was predatory or absent while maintaining ideological narratives that justify their rule. Any sustainable response must strengthen legitimate local institutions alongside targeted security efforts. Third, engagement dilemmas will intensify. The gradual normalization of Damascus and the partial acceptance of the Taliban have already moved some states from quiet contact to limited diplomacy. Similar questions may arise if JNIM or al-Shabaab consolidate further. Whether they call themselves emirates, salvation governments, or unity fronts, these movements are seeking to establish forms of governance. Some now control entire states, others run shadow administrations or fragile enclaves, but across these variations, governance by armed non-state actors has become a structural, not temporary, feature of political life across the Levant and the Sahel. The real challenge is to address the political and social vacuums that enabled their rise through inclusive reforms and regional cooperation, ensuring that such conditions do not recur across these regions.
