Introduction
The decades long proxy conflict between the State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran has finally evolved into a full scale war. This confrontation has been started with a massive pre emptive aerial strike by Israel, which successfully crippled Iranian air defense and targeted the key facilities of its nuclear program. However, despite the exemplary execution of the attack, this operation could potentially end in an overall strategical failure, which could pave the way for a nuclear proliferation in the region.
Clear operational success, possibile strategical failure
Tactical mastery, lack of coherent strategic planning
On June 13 of 2025 Israel launched a large-scale aerial assault on Iran, codenamed Operation Rising Lion. The offensive decapitated segments of Iran’s military leadership and severely damaged its air defense systems and critical nuclear infrastructure. The way was paved by Mossad, which covertly established a small UAV base inside Iran, activated overnight. Drones struck surface-to-surface missile launchers aimed at Israel, while smuggled vehicles carrying precision weapons neutralized Iranian air defenses.Thanks to this operation, Israel achieved complete air superiority over Iranian skies. Tehran’s response was disorganized, largely due to the elimination of top commanders and extensive bombings. Iran’s military vulnerabilities had already been exposed in 2024, when the Pakistani Air Force struck Baloch insurgent camps inside Iranian territory in response to an Iranian missile attack. Confronted with Pakistan’s superior military capabilities, Tehran was compelled to accept a reluctant de-escalation. However, after the initial surprise Israel advantage has been eroding throughout the days . IDF intercenption rate of Iranian missiles have been declining, underscoring its growing vulnerability in the context of a protracted war of attrition.
A possibile quagmire
Rising Lion operation was launched with two aims: destroy Iran’s nuclear program in order to prevent Teheran from developing a nuclear weapon and eventually topple the regime. Neither of these goal has been achieved yet. Firstly: Israel’s justification for this military operation against Iran has largely centered on the claim that Tehran is actively pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. However, this rationale rests on a highly contested premise. Multiple assessments by the U.S. intelligence community, including the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, have concluded that Iran is not currently undertaking key activities necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. While Iran has expanded its uranium enrichment capabilities, there is no definitive evidence indicating an intent to build a nuclear arsenal. This discrepancy raises serious concerns about the legitimacy of Israel’s preemptive posture. The invocation of existential threats based on disputed intelligence echoes the case of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which was launched under the false assumption that Baghdad possessed weapons of mass destruction. As that episode demonstrated, military interventions grounded in flawed or exaggerated claims often lead to protracted instability, humanitarian crises, and strategic setbacks. In light of this, the narrative underpinning Israel’s position risks repeating the mistakes of past interventions driven by questionable intelligence, with potentially severe consequences for regional security.
At the same time, Israel lacks the military capabilities required to destroy Iranian nuclear underground sites. The bombing campaign has failed so far in effectively crippling Iranian nuclear program. Secondly: the regime still stands. Iranian opposition forces are too fragmented both ethncally and politically to seize power and they lack the capabilities required to perform this task. The only force able to topple the current regime is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. An eventual coup performed by the IRGC would only result in another anti Israeli government, politically different from the previous, but linked by the same foreign policy goals. Regime change driven by external force rarely succeeds, enduring change must come from within. Worse, there’s a risk of national rallying around the Iranian regime, as seen during the Iran-Iraq war. Internal dissent might fade in the face of a foreign assault.
A reluctant ally
The United States has consistently identified the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon as a red line, yet its policy response has often been marked by strategic ambiguity and internal contradictions. In 2015, Washington and Iran reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) a landmark nuclear agreement that imposed stringent limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and subjected its nuclear facilities to intensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The pact prohibited enrichment beyond 3.67%, capped Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium, and decommissioned significant enrichment infrastructure, aiming to regulate geopolitical competition between Washington and Tehran and to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite Tehran’s formal compliance, evidenced by repeated IAEA confirmations throughout 2015-2018, the agreement did not significantly improve stability in the Middle East, s Iran continued to support and coordinate with proxy groups particularly in Yemen, where Houthi forces, backed by Tehran, ultimately captured the capital, Sana’a. Thus, while the JCPOA addressed nuclear constraints, it failed to curb Iran’s regional influence via non-state actors However, the deal was successful in its primary nuclear objective: Iran did not pursue a nuclear weapon. Instead, the JCPOA formalized a controlled competitive framework between the U.S. and Iran, placing enforceable limits on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
In May 2018, despite continued compliance, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the U.S. from the deal, reinstated sanctions, and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at expanding the scope of Iran’s concessions. Following the U.S. exit, Iran began to resume uranium enrichment eventually breaching JCPOA limits and enriching to higher, nearweapons-grade levels by 2020. It is significant that Iran only resumed enrichment after the U.S. withdrawal, suggesting that nuclear rollback measures remained intact until Washington’s departure. The JCPOA had indeed prevented nuclear escalation, even if broader regional instability persisted. After returning to the White House, Trump sought to pressure Iran into a new nuclear agreement, which ultimately closely resembled Obama’s deal, reflecting the relative decline of the United States and its diminished ability to unilaterally shape international outcomes.
The Israeli operation against Iran was launched with the aim to draw to the U.S. in a war against Teheran. The United States is only country which possess the weapons system aimed to hit the Fordow enrichment plant. But even though President Trump has publicly supported Israeli airstrikes, he appears reluctant to directly involve the US in the conflict. A Washington direct intervention could prompt a new spread of anti American sentiments throughout the Middle East, exactly as it happened during the Iraq war of 2003, as well as a massive domestic political backlash. However, President Donald Trump ordered a massive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, pointing out that Tehran was developing nuclear weapons, contradicting his own intelligence chief.
Despite the tactical brilliance of the strikes, they failed in neutralizing Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), estimated at approximately 400 kg of 60% U-235, and the infrastructural capacity to further enrich or weaponize this material. At the same time, satellitary images of the IAEA reported a massive truck movement around the site of Fordow. This could potentially indicate a relocation of equipment and sensitive material. In the latest analysis, the strikes didn’t hit the immense underground site near Natanz, which hosted centrifuge production and Teheran had also previously announced a new enrichment facility in an undisclosed location, which has never been inspected by the IAEA due to the bombing. At the same time, Iran has the tools and the know how functional to qiuickly restart its nuclear program, even after the American attack. In the latest analysis, the US intelligence community assessed that Iranian nuclear program was set back only of few months.
The only way to military disrupt the Iranian nuclear program is a complete occupation of the country. However, even though an American military invasion of Iran would almost certainly succeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a very big and mountainous state with a 92 million population which hosted some of the world’s most populous cities. At the same time, Teheran shares a direct border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both of them could potentially support an eventual Iranian insurgency, thanks respectively to their nuclear umbrella and impervious territory. Occupation and managing of Iran would represent an unbearable economic, political and military weight for the US, which are already engaged in a long term competition with China. The United States clearly drawn the attack in order to avoid an involvement in a full scale war, by attacking the Fordow facility after the transfer of equipment and accepting the subsequent Iranian response, largely concordated with Qatar authorities, clearly stating that the US doesn’t want to be involved in another conflict.
President Donald Trump’s recent decision to avoid direct military escalation with Iran must be understood as part of a broader pattern of strategic restraint that characterized his approach to regional conflicts in 2025. This trajectory was notably evident in May of that year, when, after several weeks of largely ineffective airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, the United States agreed to a ceasefire arrangement. The agreement marked a de facto acknowledgment of the limited efficacy of the military campaign, and stipulated an end to Houthi attacks on U.S. naval assets. Crucially, however, it omitted any reference to Israeli vessels, which remained subject to continued Houthi aggression.
This selective outcome underscored a key feature of Trump’s strategic calculus: a preference for disengagement from protracted military entanglements when clear, favorable outcomes could not be guaranteed. By accepting a ceasefire that preserved core American interests—namely the protection of U.S. forces—while tacitly tolerating continued threats to Israeli maritime security, Washington signaled a recalibration of its regional priorities. In this light, the decision to refrain from escalating the conflict with Iran, even following provocative actions, appears consistent with a broader doctrine of calibrated non-intervention. Rather than seeking decisive military victories, Trump’s administration has demonstrated a willingness to absorb limited strategic costs in exchange for avoiding deeper military commitments.
ISRAEL LONG TERM DECLINE
Economic downturn
Meanwhile, the Rising Lion operation is weighing heavily on Israel’s economy, which is aready affected by the ongoing Gaza War. The bombing campaign has been welcomed with widespread condemnation among the Muslim world. Even though some Sunni countries are privately celebrating Iranian weakening, they are growing increasingly wary about Israel unilateralism and its aim to military dominate the region. This war could reduce the incentives for the Arab states to collaborate with Israel and freeze the Arab Israeli Peace Process. At the same time, this war could also damage the already strained relations between Israel and the US. The United States long term goal in Middle East is represented by a regional stability. The constant Israeli refuse to accept a two state solution for Palestine and its unilateral military operations in Middle East could twarht the US plains for the region.
Increasing Turkish regional influence
One clear winner has emerged from the Israel-Iran conflict: Türkiye. Ankara has already exploited Iranian weakening by toppling Assad regime in Syria. Step by step, Türkiye is assuming political and military control over Syrian territory, potentially setting the stage for long-term ambitions in East Jerusalem.At the same time, Türkiye is positioning itself as the adoptive patron of Iran’s proxies, helping Tehran rebuild Hezbollah and maintain regional pressure on Israel. This process could be repeated with Hamas. This dual strategy allows Ankara to benefit from Iran’s decline, gaining leverage both by undermining rivals and by becoming essential to their survival, which are employed as counterbalance against Israel. In essence, Türkiye is turning regional disorder into strategic opportunity — filling vacuums, controlling territory, and becoming a key power broker between collapsing regimes and surviving militias.
A new security Provider for Teheran
Although relations between Tehran and Islamabad remain complex, due to divergent interests and a porous border fueling insurgency in Baluchistan. However, Iran’s heavy military losses may shift the balance. Facing mounting pressure, Tehran could turn to Islamabad as a security partner. Pakistan, alongside Türkiye, is one of the few Muslim-majority states capable of confronting Israel in a direct conflict. Increased military cooperation between the two countrie is a plausible outcome, especially if Iran fears further Israeli strikes. More significantly, Pakistan remains the only Islamic nuclear power. In a worst-case scenario, it could become Tehran’s covert partner in developing a nuclear deterrent. Finally, Islamabad might leverage Iran’s weakness to extract concession, particularly greater Iranian cooperation in suppressing the Baluch insurgency, turning Iran’s vulnerabilities into strategic assets for its regional agenda aimed to gain a “strategic depth” on its western border against India
A nuclear Iran
Prior to the attack, U.S. intelligence assessments indicated that Tehran had not yet made a definitive decision to build a nuclear bomb. Iran was seen as maintaining strategic ambiguity, advancing capabilities without crossing red lines. However, the scale and precision of Israel’s recent offensive may have changed the calculus in Tehran. While the recent Israeli and U.S. military strikes against Iran, though tactically effective, failed to neutralize Iran’s nuclear infrastructure or stockpile of highly enriched uranium, they may nonetheless reshape Tehran’s strategic calculus. The operations, by demonstrating both precision and political restraint, particularly the absence of a U.S. intent to pursue full-scale invasion, send a dual message. On one hand, Iran may now recognize that its conventional military forces are insufficient to deter technologically superior adversaries, especially after the exposure of its air defenses and the decapitation of key military figures. On the other hand, the restraint shown by Washington could signal to Tehran that negotiations remain a viable and perhaps necessary path forward.
This dynamic creates a paradoxical pressure. Given the recognition that an outright invasion is unlikely in the short term, Iran might feel safer re-engaging diplomatically and making nuclear concessions, particularly if this buys regime security and economic relief. However, the same strikes may have intensified perceptions of existential vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis Israel, whose capacity for precise, far-reaching operations is now unmistakable. Prior to the attacks, U.S. intelligence assessed that Iran had not committed to building a nuclear weapon, instead preserving ambiguity while advancing its capabilities. The scale and effectiveness of the strikes may have disrupted this balance, compelling Iran to reassess its deterrent posture.
Consequently, Tehran now faces a strategic crossroads: either return to negotiations under pressure, potentially with deeper concessions, or make an irreversible decision to pursue a nuclear weapon as the ultimate deterrent. Ironically, military action intended to delay nuclear proliferation may have accelerated it. A nuclear-armed Iran would profoundly alter the Middle East’s strategic landscape, enhancing Tehran’s leverage while likely triggering a regional arms race. In particular, Saudi Arabia, Iran’s principal rival for regional influence, would likely feel compelled to acquire a comparable capability, either through indigenous development or external procurement. Similarly, Türkiye, with its growing strategic ambitions and deteriorating trust in extended deterrence, may no longer be willing to rely solely on NATO’s nuclear umbrella. In short, an Iranian bomb would undermine the fragile nuclear status quo, potentially inaugurating a regional arms race with far-reaching implications for global nonproliferation efforts and regional stability. Thus, the long-term impact of these strikes will depend less on their immediate tactical results and more on the strategic choices they provoke in Tehran.
The logic of nuclear deterrence in the modern world
Recent geopolitical developments underscore a sobering reality: states lacking nuclear capabilities appear markedly more vulnerable to external aggression. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine followed the latter’s relinquishment of its Soviet-inherited nuclear arsenal. Israel has targeted Iran precisely because Tehran, at least for now, has not crossed the nuclear threshold. China’s posture toward Taiwan is shaped in part by the island’s lack of a credible nuclear deterrent. In contrast, nuclear-armed states such as North Korea and Pakistan remain largely insulated from direct military threats, despite internal instability and external provocations. The strategic message, whether intended or not, is increasingly clear: Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty and security in an era of asymmetric power and contested norms.
Conclusion
Israel’s recent operation against Iran constitutes a notable tactical success. The precision strikes effectively degraded Iranian military capabilities, disrupted command structures, and temporarily neutralized key elements of its defense architecture. However, the operation appears to lack a coherent long-term strategic framework and is unsupported by the material and political means required to achieve its stated objectives, namely, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the destabilization of the regime. Absent the collapse of the Iranian government, the operation may ultimately amount to a strategic failure. It risks accelerating Iran’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent, thereby triggering regional nuclear proliferation and long-term instability. In this light, short-term military gains may give way to a significantly more dangerous and less controllable strategic environment in the Middle East. And is aleady favoring the regional ambitions of Israel competitors
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