This article was originally published in Italian by Giovanni Chiacchio, a writer for Hariciye, at the Machiavelli Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Italy.
ABSTRACT
In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a military and technological decline, exacerbated by commercial deficits and dependence on foreign technology, particularly German technology. The Ottoman war industry was inadequate during the First World War and subsequent conflicts.
The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which ratified the birth of modern Turkey, encouraged a move toward a more autonomous defense industry. However, production still relied on foreign licenses and imports, and the scarcity of resources led to logistical difficulties. American aid provided through the Lend-Lease program during the Second World War could be termed the beginning of dependence on the United States.
During the Cold War, Turkey integrated into the Western bloc and benefited from large-scale American military aid, but this developed a critical dependence on external supplies. The US embargo following the Cyprus crisis (1974-1978) exposed the lack of strategic autonomy and led to the establishment of the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces to encourage national industry.
From the 1980s, under Turgut Özal’s administration, Turkey implemented structural reforms.
After 2002, Erdoğan accelerated domestic production, reducing foreign dependence.
The Turkish defense industry became a leading power in the sector with the success of the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles and became a global actor by achieving 1.7% of global arms exports. However, some weaknesses persist: dependence on imported components, economic fragility linking sustainability to exports, the increasing politicization of the sector, and controversial decisions such as the acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which limits integration with Western partners.
ORIGINS
Characterized by internal struggles, external pressure from major European powers, and the “imperial burden” of a compact Turkish majority living alongside ethnically diverse peoples, the Empire experienced a deep decline compared to its strategic rivals in the first half of the 19th century. This decline was also concretized by the deep backwardness of its military. In this context, the Treaty of Balta Liman, signed between Istanbul and the British Empire in 1838, led to a significant increase in the import of British goods into Turkey. Consequently, the Ottoman balance of payments suffered a heavy deficit, which, combined with the general absence of a strong middle class and necessary technologies, made it extremely difficult to find the financial resources required to establish a robust defense industry . Subsequently, the growing geopolitical rapprochement between Istanbul and the German Empire guaranteed the Turkish state the necessary assistance to significantly strengthen its armaments. The establishment of the Directorate of War Production in 1908 led to a significant expansion of the Ottoman defense industry, but this industry found it difficult to escape the Ottoman technological dependence on German know-how .
During the First World War, the Ottoman war industry was largely inadequate to meet the country’s needs, contributing to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire’s military. In the War of Independence waged by the nationalist forces under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to establish the Turkish national state, much of the know-how and equipment necessary for the production of war materials was obtained as a result of their transfer from Istanbul, which was under the military occupation of the Entente Powers, to the Anatolian Peninsula, under the auspices of the General Directorate of Military Factories established in 1921. Despite the success of the Turkish armies, the production of war materials was once again insufficient to meet the country’s needs.
EMPIRE AND NATION
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ratified the new Turkish government’s recognition as a fully sovereign nation-state, encompassing the territories that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, including the Anatolian Peninsula, Istanbul, and the Marmara and the Straits. The transition of the Turkish state from a transnational empire to a nation-state required a radical reorganization of the country’s “Grand Strategy,” which now focused on preserving national sovereignty within the existing borders.
Severely affected by the occupation of a major industrial center like Istanbul during the War of Independence, the new Turkish government, following the Izmir Economic Congress, invested in the creation of a defense industry characterized by a wider geographical spread and greater participation of private capital. At the same time, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk skillfully leveraged the fragmentation that emerged in the international arena after the war, securing the support of many geopolitical actors who wished to maintain good relations with the Ankara government.
The new Turkish defense industry focused predominantly on the import of weapon systems and their production under license. The new Turkish state wisely obtained the support of foreign actors in its own interest during its early years . In this context, while the profound diversification of import sources prevented any single actor from assuming a monopolistic role, it significantly complicated the supply chain of the armed forces. Consequently, a large part of local capacities was dedicated to the maintenance of foreign systems. The outbreak of the Second World War led to an abrupt change in this paradigm. Due to Turkey’s strategic location, the United States viewed the country’s defense as a vital interest for its own security. Ankara thus began to receive large amounts of aid under the Lend-Lease program through the mediation of the British.
COLD WAR
The division of the world into two blocs after 1945 and the onset of the Cold War led to a radical restructuring of the Turkish defense industry. The end of the fragmented state of the international system and the emergence of a bipolar order caused a radical change in Turkey’s geostrategic position. Turkey was no longer a country located in the middle of two worlds but a country located on the outer border of two blocs. The revanchist intentions of the USSR, determined to renegotiate the terms of the Treaty of Kars (1921), which ratified the loss of most of the territories occupied by Tsarist Russia in 1878 in favor of the Turkish government, and the Montreux Convention (1938), which regulated the passage through the Straits, ensured Ankara’s full entry into the Western sphere of influence. The Turkish armed forces were completely re-equipped with a large amount of military aid provided by Western states.
The “Truman Doctrine” had a considerably large impact in this regard. This aid significantly increased the power coefficient of Ankara’s armed forces, but at the cost of efforts to increase domestic production being relegated to the background. While this situation led to the formation of a strong armed force, this force also developed a deep dependence on continuous arms supply from the United States. This contradiction would emerge later in the 1960s.
During this period, a radical change occurred primarily in the nature of US military aid; aid was no longer provided in the form of military grants but through Turkey’s inclusion in the Foreign Military Sales program. During the same period, the violent conflicts that took place between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus between 1963 and 1964 led the Ankara government to consider the possibility of military intervention. To prevent this possibility, US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, expressing the US administration’s concerns about the use of US weapon systems exported to Turkey, stating that their use must comply with Article IV of the 1947 Technical and Economic Cooperation Agreement .
This event once again brought to light the deep vulnerabilities of the Turkish defense industry, the lack of strategic autonomy, and the country’s inability to project its power without US approval. The collapse of the fragile ceasefire established in Cyprus following the coup by the Greek junta in 1974 led to Ankara’s military intervention, which resulted in the division of the island. Following the conflict, the US imposed an arms export ban on Turkey, although this ban was lifted in 1978. Despite its short duration, the embargo had a lasting impact on Turkish strategic planning. On August 27, 1974, with the financial support of the public, the “Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Land Forces,” whose mission was to promote the country’s strategic autonomy, was established. The Foundation would later provide the necessary capital for the establishment of a robust national defense industry.
TOWARDS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
The late 1970s were filled with increasing economic and political instability in the country, culminating in the military coup by General Kenan Evren in 1980. The 1980 coup undoubtedly left lasting effects on the Republic of Turkey.
Turgut Özal, the former Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry who was at the forefront of efforts to reform the country’s economy after the coup, was appointed as deputy prime minister by the new military junta. Continuing his efforts under a different executive body and later rising to the position of head of the Council of Ministers, Özal strived to increase Turkey’s self-sufficiency in defense industry investments. This goal was concretized by the launch of a policy aimed at deeply reforming the local defense industry . A definite turning point in this regard was the adoption of Law No. 3238. This law provided for the establishment of an administrative coordination mechanism for the defense industry, consisting of three institutions:
• Defense Industry Executive Committee: Composed of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of General Staff, tasked with coordinating all organizations operating in the defense sector at the national level;
• Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM): Tasked with implementing the decisions taken by the Executive Committee and planning production and research;
• Defense Industry Support Fund: Tasked with financing the objectives of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries.
Özal’s reforms provided two fundamental elements for the increase of Turkish war production: the adoption of policies focused on the realization of long-term goals and a centralized strategic planning that guaranteed the necessary financial basis for their implementation. In particular, the structure of the Executive Committee allowed for the adjustment of policies related to the defense industry according to the strategic needs required by the country’s international situation. These regulations, along with Law No. 3388, the Law on the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces, enabled the creation of an effective working mechanism for the structure of the defense industry through centralized regulation. The Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces also influenced the integration of programs that could be used for new projects developed in the defense industry sector. However, when the SSM was brought under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, long-term policies based on strategic planning were partially abandoned, and a work focused on using ready-made solutions to meet the short-term needs of the armed forces was maintained .
ONE COUNTRY, TWO WORLDS
The end of the Cold War led to a radical restructuring of Turkey’s Grand Strategy. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the elimination of an existential threat for Turkey and a fundamental change in its geostrategic position. Ankara ceased to be the border between two blocs and once again became the intersection point of two civilizations. In this context, the Turkish state launched a new foreign policy focused on projecting its military, political, and cultural power toward the Middle East and the Turkic-speaking countries that regained their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union . The establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in Istanbul in 1992 was the first step in this process. At the same time, in addition to terrorism issues such as the intensification of the actions of the terrorist organization PKK, many international disputes also occupied the agenda of the Republic of Turkey.
Deep diplomatic tensions were experienced between Turkey and its traditional allies, the United States and Europe, during these years. The strategic context mentioned above contributed to the revitalization of the reform program launched in the 1980s.
Over-reliance on foreign imports constituted a significant obstacle to the conduct of counter-terrorism operations targeting the PKK and to Ankara’s ability to project military power. The definitive institutionalization of a policy aimed at self-sufficiency in defense industry production occurred after the electoral success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. In 2004, the Executive Organ, led by the new prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, decided to launch a policy aimed at transitioning to new procurement models focused on the maximum utilization of national resources and domestic production . This initiative, which was also included in the subsequent National Development Plan, was concretized by the launch of various military programs aimed at re-equipping the armed forces with locally produced platforms. These programs were:
• MILGEM, aimed at the production of various warships;
• Atak, aimed at the production of military helicopters;
• Altay, aimed at the production of tanks.
At the same time, TUSAŞ acquired all of Lockheed Martin’s shares in Turkish Aerospace Industry, and subsequently returned these shares to the full control of the state.
UAVs
As part of the broad reform program affecting Turkey, special importance was given to the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sector. These platforms are characterized by low production and maintenance costs while also offering versatile use. Turkey’s first national UAV development program was initiated in the 1980s. Like many previous initiatives, this program focused on the purchase of foreign systems. In the mid-2000s, the Turkish armed forces became heavily dependent on drone imports from Israel. This situation became extremely worrying for Ankara officials due to the deep tensions arising from the renewed violence in Palestine involving Israel. The continuous refusal of the US to allow the transfer of MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles to Turkey also posed an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of a powerful unmanned aerial vehicle fleet .
This situation compelled the SSM to initiate a tactical UAV development project. The tender for the production of the new weapon system was won by the Bayraktar TB1 unmanned aerial vehicle, produced by Baykar Technology. However, the mass production of this system was never launched; instead, it was preferred to modify the initial project to increase the system’s capacity. This operation resulted in the launch of the mass production of the higher-performing Bayraktar TB2. The new aerial vehicle immediately attracted attention with its balance between low production and maintenance costs and good performance levels.
The low maintenance cost and high performance of the UAVs led to their rapid integration into the operational level of the armed forces, becoming a significant component of their operational doctrines.
In 2018, the Turkish army conducted a successful attack on PKK formations in Sinjar using drones and artillery units. The operation resulted in the death of İsmail Özden, one of the organization’s leading members. The following year, Ankara deployed its unmanned aerial vehicles to defend the Libyan Government of National Accord, which was under siege in the city of Tripoli. The Turkish intervention managed to defeat Haftar’s forces, compelling Haftar to abandon his plans to occupy the Libyan capital .
Following these deployments, in 2020, Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles were also used, along with KORAL electronic warfare systems, in a large-scale attack against Syrian government forces. This intervention by the Turkish government using UAVs led to the halt of attacks carried out by Syrian government forces on the city of Idlib . Finally, in the same year, the Azerbaijani armed forces heavily used Turkish-made UAVs in the second conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, destroying Armenia’s air defense . The way Ankara utilized unmanned systems constituted a real turning point in military history. The Turkish armed forces were able to combine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions with SEAD/DEAD (suppression or destruction of enemy air defense) roles by using a large number of UAVs as a real air force .
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES
In 2017, the first significant arms export agreement for the Turkish defense industry was signed, concerning the supply of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles to the State of Qatar . This agreement was followed by the signing of important contracts with Pakistan and Ukraine, particularly concerning the supply of unmanned aerial vehicles and warships under the MILGEM program. The significant military successes achieved by Azerbaijan and Ukraine through the use of Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles led to a strong increase in demand for Turkish weapons in the African continent, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the European continent.
Consequently, Turkey’s share of global arms exports rose to 1.7%, making Ankara the 11th global exporter in this sector . At the same time, Turkey achieved a dominant position in the military unmanned aerial vehicle market, controlling approximately 65% of this market .
The success of the MILGEM and Bayraktar platforms paved the way for the development of new, more advanced types of weapons. Bayraktar Technologies quickly grew considerably, and the Bayraktar Akıncı, another unmanned aerial vehicle designed by the company, has a greater payload capacity and significantly higher performance than the Bayraktar TB2, entered service in 2021, and immediately achieved great success in the international market. Finally, the company is also investing in the development of the Bayraktar Kızılelma, a jet-powered unmanned system. At the same time, officials in Ankara made major investments in the construction of the KAAN, a fully domestically produced fifth-generation multi-role stealth aircraft.
Despite the important results achieved, the Turkish defense industry is still exposed to significant structural weaknesses. Firstly, the country’s fragile economy makes the financing of expensive projects to develop increasingly modern weapons extremely difficult. Thus, the defense sector has become dependent on profits from exports for its sustainability. This situation may lead the Turkish defense industry in the future to prioritize products suitable for export over the country’s strategic needs. Alternatively, a possible drop in exports could force the Turkish state to transfer quite significant resources to the defense industry. Secondly, most of the projects developed since 2004 have been carried out according to the “platform first, components later” model. This has enabled the rapid development and production of new weapon systems but has not eliminated the country’s dependence on certain types of components imported from abroad. This situation persists particularly regarding the engines used in the country’s main weapon systems. Investments made for the production of these closed-loop platforms are extremely costly.
Ultimately, the Turkish defense industry has been characterized by increasing politicization in recent years. In 2018, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) was placed under the direct authority of the Presidency, which significantly increased the weight of political stakeholders in decision-making processes, at the expense of technical experts. This process of politicization has also extended to the country’s foreign situation . Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system was perceived as a reaction by Ankara to the increasing criticism directed by Western nations regarding the authorities’ management of the country’s domestic politics. However, the consequences of this choice have proven to be heavily negative. The Turkish armed forces were excluded from the F-35 program and had to bear high maintenance costs for the system itself, which also proved impossible to integrate into the country’s defensive network. This state of affairs is currently making Turkey’s integration into the Security Action for Europe program rather difficult, potentially precluding great opportunities for Ankara’s companies.
CONCLUSION
From the contemporary era, first as a supranational empire and then as a nation-state, Turkey has historically been significantly dependent on foreign sources for the production of war materials. This situation has posed a significant threat to the country’s security and a major obstacle to its ability to project power. The US embargo following the Cyprus crisis prompted Turkish officials to make major investments to localize defense industry investments with the aim of reducing the country’s foreign dependence. This goal has been achieved through robust centralized strategic planning, strong political will, and a solid capital base. Today, the Turkish defense industry not only meets a large portion of domestic demand but has also made the country one of the leading arms exporters globally. This situation has significantly increased Turkey’s influence in the international arena while also contributing to the country’s economy. However, financial dependence on exports and increasing politicization pose significant obstacles to the long-term sustainability of the Turkish defense industry.
