The past decade has witnessed the growing importance of Turkestan countries in the geopolitics of Eurasia, following their independence after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. With their rich energy resources, strategic location between Asia and Europe, and historical susceptibility to power struggles among great powers since the 18th century, the region has emerged as one of the key arenas of competition in the 21st century. Despite China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s efforts to reassert its historical influence, and the United States’ sustained security interests despite its withdrawal from the region, the multipolar dynamics continue to prevail. In this context, the European Union’s policies toward Turkestan offer a subject worthy of reevaluation, both in terms of bilateral relations with the regional countries and within the broader framework of global competition.
Although the European Union had long maintained a distant and low-profile approach toward the region, it established an institutional framework by adopting the “EU-Central Asia Strategy” in 2007. This strategy was updated in 2019, acquiring a more flexible, inclusive, and pragmatic orientation. Developed under the vision of a “resilient, prosperous, and cooperative” Turkestan, these policy documents demonstrate the EU’s attempt to balance its normative agenda with interest-based themes such as economic cooperation and energy security.
In other words, the writing had long been on the wall. The recent uproar in Turkey over the Turkestan states’ move to recognize the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole legitimate authority of the island did not appear overnight. The foundations of the path that has led to the present were laid as early as 2007.
The Evolution of the European Union’s Turkestan Policy
The backbone of the European Union’s strategic approach toward Turkestan was laid out in the 2007 “EU-Central Asia Strategy for Partnership and Cooperation.” After 16 years of failing to formulate a coherent policy for the region, the EU aimed with this strategy to structure its relations with Turkestan countries within a comprehensive framework. This document proposed cooperation in thematic areas such as political dialogue, energy security, development assistance, human rights, education, and the rule of law—making it a typical example of the EU’s normative foreign policy approach.
However, the 2007 strategy remained limited in practice. The authoritarian nature of the political regimes in the region, their reluctance to reform, and the EU’s own lack of sustained interest made it difficult to achieve tangible results. Compared to China’s infrastructure investments and Russia’s security-oriented influence tools, the EU’s normative approach began to appear less attractive and less effective.
The new strategy announced in 2019 acknowledged these limitations and introduced a more flexible framework. Released under the vision of a “strong, resilient, prosperous, and cooperative Central Asia,” the document sought to strike a balance between normative goals and interest-based diplomacy by placing greater emphasis on sustainable development, green transition, digitalization, and regional cooperation. During this period, the EU developed high-level political dialogue mechanisms with countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In particular, Uzbekistan’s partial reform process since 2016 created opportunities for closer cooperation.
Two major trends characterize the EU’s post-2019 approach: First, a search for coordination that promotes multilateralism and regional cooperation. Second, an effort to present alternative models to the growing influence of China. However, the EU’s attempts have yet to reach true strategic depth due to ongoing limitations in resources, institutional fragmentation, and the delicate balances in its relations with local regimes.
What Is Offered and What Is Gained?
Turkestan—especially countries like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—has the potential to contribute to Europe’s energy security, particularly since the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022, which triggered energy shortages across the continent. In this context, the EU considers projects that transport regional energy resources through non-Russian routes—such as trans-Caspian energy projects and the Southern Gas Corridor that connects initiatives like TANAP and TAP—as strategic priorities. Parallel to this, through initiatives like the “Global Gateway,” the EU is attempting to develop alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the field of transportation infrastructure. However, these efforts have yet to match China’s financial scale and implementation speed. Previously launched initiatives like TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) have also gradually lost their impact.
The EU is one of Turkestan’s leading trade partners. The Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Kazakhstan, which entered into force in 2020, represents the most advanced framework in this field. Negotiations for a similar agreement with Uzbekistan are still ongoing. In its trade policies, the EU adopts a “value-based” approach, incorporating criteria such as sustainability, green transition, and human rights. However, the capacity of regional countries to comply with these standards is limited, leading to delays and flexible interpretations in implementation. Furthermore, the EU’s direct investments in the region remain more cautious and limited compared to those of Russian and Chinese companies.
One of the EU’s strongest assets lies in its soft power policies in the fields of education, cultural exchange, and institutional capacity-building with the countries of the region. Accordingly, student exchange programs, research collaborations, and inter-university networks have been ongoing for years. These programs have had a particularly notable impact on younger generations. Nevertheless, the EU’s normative efforts in areas such as human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule of law are often constrained by the unwillingness of local governments and a politically repressive environment. In such contexts, the EU tries to exert influence through indirect tools such as civil society support and capacity-building grants. Yet, the growing anti-Western rhetoric in some countries undermines the legitimacy of these efforts.
The rationale for partnerships is not limited to energy and trade. The EU tends to view security threats in Turkestan primarily from a “transnational threats” perspective. The sudden withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the subsequent regime change have raised serious concerns related to radicalization, organized crime, migration flows, and border security. These developments have further increased the fragility of regional stability, especially for neighboring countries like Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In response, the EU has provided support through technical assistance, border management training, and humanitarian aid. However, since the regional security landscape is largely shaped by the more direct and military-oriented engagements of Russia and China, it is difficult to argue that the EU’s contributions have made a significant impact.
Of course, this is not the only challenge. Although the EU’s policies toward Turkestan offer a generally balanced and multidimensional framework, their impact on the ground often falls short of their potential. The reasons lie in factors that limit the EU’s influence in the region.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative presents large-scale infrastructure investments that provide a rapid, visible, and unconditional development model for the region’s countries. Meanwhile, Russia continues to wield considerable influence based on historical, linguistic, and security-related ties. Compared to these two actors, the EU’s long-term, bureaucratic projects based on normative reforms appear less attractive and effective. Unlike China and Russia, EU-funded projects are subject to complex procedures and lengthy approval processes. Moreover, at a time when the EU is preoccupied with internal challenges such as migration, economic crises, and the war in Ukraine, its capacity to develop effective policies for peripheral regions like Turkestan has weakened even further.
On the other hand, most of the regimes in Turkestan are authoritarian in nature and highly cautious of external intervention. The EU’s proposals regarding democratization, human rights, and governance are often perceived by these regimes as interference in their domestic affairs and are met with resistance. For this very reason, especially after 2019, the EU has adopted a more “pragmatic normative” approach, preferring to encourage limited progress without severing dialogue. As can be seen, this approach has begun to bear fruit.
Have We Been Forsaken?
In this context, it is not surprising that the Turkic states prefer the Greek Cypriot Administration over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey’s engagement with Turkistan began on January 27, 1992, through the establishment of TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) under the initiative of then-President Turgut Özal. However, following Özal’s untimely death, these initiatives were left incomplete and only resumed during the era of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). For nearly two decades, relations remained stagnant. Consequently, Turkey was unable to compete with the joint investments of actors like the European Union.
On the other hand, realpolitik does not allow for sentimentality. Today, the Turkic states are caught between Russia on one side and China on the other. Although relations may appear stable for now, it is worth remembering that just a few days after the outbreak of the Ukraine War, Russia’s Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev threatened to “liberate” Russians living in northern Kazakhstan. This alone makes it rational for these countries to seek to diversify their alliances. In this sense, the decision to hold the next summit of the Organization of Turkic States in the TRNC is nothing more than cold comfort — a symbolic soft power gesture aimed at soothing Turkey’s disappointment.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to disregard Turkey’s relations with these countries and the potential roles it can assume. Turkey’s soft power in the region remains significant. According to a 2022 survey by Central Asian Barometer, the rates at which Turkey is viewed as a friendly country were 85% in Kazakhstan, 75% in Uzbekistan, 89% in Kyrgyzstan, and 92% in Turkmenistan. These figures alone attest to the magnitude of Turkey’s soft power in the region.
At this point, Turkey emerges as a key balancing and facilitating actor thanks to both historical ties and its multidimensional relationships with the region. The institutionalized cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States increases Turkey’s visibility in Turkistan and lays the groundwork for potential joint ventures with the EU.
However, in order for Turkey and the EU to establish an effective and complementary partnership in the region, strategic alignment is just as necessary as mutual political will. Fluctuations in Turkey’s relations with the West occasionally disrupt this potential. Yet technical projects developed around shared regional interests are likely to be less vulnerable to such political turbulence. In this regard, developing functional cooperation models in third regions like Turkistan—independent of Turkey’s bilateral relations with EU countries—could strengthen Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives and increase its strategic value in the eyes of the EU. As an initial step, Turkish civil society organizations and professional associations, which are better positioned to engage with the region, could facilitate the advancement of the EU’s normative agenda using more “local” tools. In doing so, Turkey could serve as a media conduit for the West.
Conclusion
The European Union’s (EU) policy toward Turkistan reflects an effort to strike a balance between normative principles and geopolitical realities at a time when global power dynamics are being reshaped. In this process, Turkey—thanks to its historical ties and growing regional influence—emerges as a valuable partner that can contribute to making EU policies more visible and sustainable on the ground. However, Turkey must awaken from sentimental dreams, while the EU should reduce its prejudiced stance toward Turkey. The development of complementary partnerships between Turkey and the EU in Turkistan presents not only an opportunity for the region’s countries, but also a strategic opening for the future of the Transatlantic world order.
