Despite the rapidly evolving dynamics of technological advancements in 21st-century battlefields, the strategic and tactical importance of tanks has not diminished; rather, it has become more complex. While some military analysts claim that the development of modern anti-tank weapons and the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) signal the end of tanks, the reality of contemporary conflicts suggests the opposite. Tanks remain the backbone of modern armies, but there is a pressing need to rethink how this backbone should be shaped.
The increasing complexity of modern battlefields has clearly exposed the limitations of doctrines relying solely on heavy main battle tanks (MBTs). Today, armies face hybrid threats, asymmetric warfare, urban combat, rapid deployment requirements, and constantly evolving operational environments, necessitating more flexible and multidimensional approaches. In this context, the role of highly maneuverable light and medium-class tanks has gained critical importance.
Given Türkiye’s geopolitical position and the security threats it faces, reevaluating the structure of the Turkish Armed Forces’ armored units has become inevitable. While the Altay main battle tank forms a strong foundation, integrating light tank classes as support elements is not merely an option but a necessity.
Historical Perspective: Lessons from German Tank Doctrine and the “Big Tank Obsession”
The tank battles of World War II offer invaluable lessons that remain relevant for modern armies. The early successes of the German Wehrmacht were largely due to the effective use of light and medium tanks. During the Blitzkrieg operations of 1939–1941, Panzer I, Panzer II, and early Panzer III tanks, with their lightweight and effective designs, could swiftly penetrate enemy lines, disrupt communication networks, and neutralize command and control centers.
However, following these early successes, what could be described as the German “big tank obsession” led them to pursue projects like the Tiger I, Tiger II, Jagdtiger, and ultimately the 188-ton Maus. While these heavy tanks boasted impressive technical specifications, their operational costs and tactical limitations negatively impacted the overall effectiveness of German tank forces over time.
The Tiger tank, with an average fuel consumption of 6–8 km/liter, severely limited its operational range. The maintenance requirements of a single Tiger I were equivalent to those of three Panzer IVs. More critically, prioritizing the production of these heavy tanks at the expense of light and medium tank production significantly reduced the tactical agility of German forces.
The situation on the Eastern Front after 1943 painfully highlighted this reality. Soviet forces’ T-34 light tanks, with their numerical superiority and maneuverability, were able to neutralize the limited number of German heavy tanks. This experience demonstrates that tank strength should not be measured solely by individual vehicle performance but by overall operational flexibility.
Post-Cold War Paradigm Shifts
The end of the Cold War marked a turning point for tank doctrine. Large-scale tank battles gave way to low-intensity conflicts, peacekeeping operations, and asymmetric threats. During this period, many armies realized that heavy main battle tanks were often excessive for these new operational environments.
The conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s provided critical lessons for tank doctrine. These operations revealed that 60–70-ton main battle tanks struggled to perform effectively in narrow mountain paths, historic city centers, and densely populated civilian areas. This underscored the growing need for lighter and more flexible armored vehicles.
Israel was one of the first nations to experience these challenges during the development of its Merkava tank. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel adopted a balanced approach, incorporating platforms from different weight classes rather than relying solely on heavy tanks. This strategy significantly reduced tank losses in subsequent conflicts.
Türkiye’s frequent use of M-48 and M-60 tanks in counterterrorism operations and urban warfare, both domestically and abroad, has been criticized. However, feedback from personnel on the ground indicating that these tanks “get the job done” cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, no matter how modernized, these tank models are outdated, and considering the Altay tank as a direct replacement for them would be misguided.
The Ukraine War: New Realities of Modern Tank Warfare
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war since 2022 has provided a valuable opportunity to observe the evolution of modern tank doctrine. From the early days of the conflict, Russia’s heavy tank formations suffered unexpectedly high losses. Modern Russian tanks like the T-80 and T-90 proved vulnerable to Ukraine’s modern anti-tank weapons. More critically, the logistical dependencies of these heavy tanks significantly constrained operational success.
Ukraine’s successful counteroffensives were largely carried out with light and medium-weight armored vehicles. Vehicles like the BTR-4 and BMP-2, employing hit-and-run tactics, delivered effective blows to Russian heavy tank formations. Notably, during the September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive and the November 2022 Kherson operation, Ukrainian forces used light armored vehicles to breach enemy lines, achieving critical successes in situations where heavy Russian tanks lacked maneuverability.
Lessons from the siege of Mariupol, the battles of Bakhmut, and the Avdiivka clashes further underscore the critical role of light tanks in urban warfare.
Advantages of a Forgotten Tank Class
The “Main Battle Tank” concept, which became the dominant tank class after World War II, nearly eliminated light and medium tanks. However, modern requirements indicate a renewed need for this forgotten class on the battlefield.
In urban combat, the greatest advantage is the ability to maneuver swiftly through narrow streets. Main battle tanks weighing 60–70 tons cannot navigate 3–4-meter-wide streets or may become trapped under collapsed buildings. In contrast, light tanks weighing 25–35 tons can navigate these obstacles more effectively.
As seen during the clashes at the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, Ukrainian defenders used light armored vehicles to mount effective defenses in the factory’s confined spaces, while Russian T-72 and T-80 tanks lost maneuverability in these tight areas, becoming easy targets for RPGs and anti-tank mines.
Logistics in urban operations are far more complex and risky than in open terrain. Narrow streets, destroyed buildings, and the constant threat of attack make fuel and ammunition resupply challenging. In such environments, the low fuel consumption and rapid resupply capabilities of light tanks provide a critical operational advantage.
While a T-90 tank consumes an average of 2–3 km/liter in urban settings, a modern light tank can achieve 6–8 km/liter efficiency. This difference is vital in prolonged urban sieges.
Light tanks’ smaller-caliber weapons and more precise firing capabilities help reduce civilian casualties. Heavy tanks equipped with 120mm main guns can cause collateral damage to multiple buildings with a single shot in urban areas, whereas light tanks with 90mm or 105mm guns offer more controlled firepower.
The Necessity of Light Tanks for the Turkish Armed Forces: Operational Requirements
Türkiye’s journey with light tanks began during World War II. The Kırıkkale Tank, a prototype developed with limited resources and modeled after the Soviet T-26, never entered serial production, primarily due to its inferiority compared to modern counterparts and the availability of U.S.-provided M-4 Sherman tanks.
Türkiye’s security threats and operational environment clearly highlight the need for light tank systems. The Turkish Armed Forces’ recent operational experiences underscore the scope of this need.
Comparing the performance of the more agile and modernized M60T Sabra tanks (upgraded by Israel) with the formidable German Leopard 2 tanks during operations like Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, and Spring Shield reveals that Leopard 2 tanks suffered higher losses.
The complex topography of Syria and the mountainous regions along the Iraqi border highlight the advantages of light tanks. Narrow valleys, steep slopes, and limited infrastructure restrict the movement of heavy tanks, while light tanks offer greater mobility. Asymmetric tactics employed by terrorist organizations like PKK/YPG and ISIS cannot be effectively countered with conventional heavy tank doctrines.
Türkiye’s geopolitical position necessitates the potential to conduct simultaneous operations on multiple fronts, including its eastern and southern borders, the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean, each with unique operational requirements. The ability to use light tanks in airborne operations is particularly appealing. In this context, light tanks can serve as cost-effective support units for the Altay tank.
From an economic perspective, global interest in the light tank market is growing. Developing countries seek more economical options, while developed nations evaluate light tanks for urban, amphibious, and airborne operations.
Conclusion: A Return to the Past for the Future of Armored Forces
Lessons from the Ukraine war, the increasing importance of urban warfare, the diversification of hybrid threats, and the pace of technological advancements clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of doctrines relying solely on heavy main battle tanks.
The Turkish Armed Forces’ robust armored force structure, centered around the Altay main battle tank, is undoubtedly a critical strategic asset. However, I believe supplementing this structure with light tank classes is a necessity. This will enhance the TSK’s operational capacity, provide cost-effectiveness, and strengthen Türkiye’s defense industry capabilities.
Success on the future battlefield depends as much on doctrinal flexibility as it does on technological superiority. In this context, the role of light tanks in modern armies should be seen not merely as supportive but as an integral part of core operational capabilities. Türkiye’s timely recognition of this reality and the implementation of necessary steps are of critical importance for preparing for future conflicts.
