Turkey-Somalia Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
On February 8, 2024, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between Turkey and Somalia was signed by the defense ministers of both sides in Ankara. The agreement, approved by the Somali Parliament and Council of Ministers on February 21, 2024, has not yet been submitted for Turkish Parliament’s approval, and it’s unknown when it will be. This agreement was generally received positively in Somalia, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said it was “the best agreement they have made so far.” Indeed, it’s important that this agreement with Turkey comes immediately after the agreement between Somalia’s separatist administration Somaliland and neighboring Ethiopia, and will create a situation that protects and strengthens Somalia’s interests and territorial integrity.
The details of the agreement still appear to be unclear, but the most prominent area is that Somalia has given Turkey full authority in its territorial waters during this ten-year agreement period. In other words, the Turkish Naval Forces will protect Somalia’s territorial waters for ten years. Additionally, according to statements made by Somalia’s President to AA, this agreement “includes cooperation in areas such as fighting terrorism, external threats, piracy and illegal fishing in Somalia, protecting coasts and developing marine resources.” The Somali Prime Minister stated that at the end of ten years, Somalia will have a navy capable of protecting its own seas, and during this process, Turkey will contribute to building the Somali navy with the train-and-equip model.
The Somali President said, “we didn’t request this support to fight Ethiopia or invade another country. This is an agreement made only to support defending our own country.” Additionally, a Somali official stated that the agreement includes a part about extracting underwater resources for Somalia. At this point, with the memorandum of understanding signed on March 7, 2024, Turkey was granted the right to “explore, evaluate, develop and produce oil from Somalia’s land or sea blocks.” With this agreement, the nature of the “exchange” between Turkey and Somalia became clearer. It’s not difficult to predict that these developments will offer Turkey opportunities for closer cooperation with Somalia in areas such as commercial relations and infrastructure investments, in addition to privileges granted on hydrocarbon resources.
It is known that fishermen from countries like Pakistan and Iran engage in unofficial fishing activities in Somali waters. The Turkish navy is also expected to stop/deter these unofficial fishing activities. The Somali President also mentions that a joint naval force will be established between the two countries. How this joint naval force will be established, whether it will work under TSK or Somali institutions in the chain of command, such details have not yet been clearly shared with the public. Considering that this is a framework agreement, we can say that the details of cooperation will become clearer in sub-protocols to be made in the future. Meanwhile, Turkey is not the only country that has signed a memorandum of understanding with Somalia on military cooperation. In February, the US also signed a memorandum of understanding with Somalia. According to the agreement, the US will build five military bases for the Somali army as part of a $100 million project.
The Somaliland-Ethiopia Agreement
On January 1, 2024, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia. This memorandum aims to address landlocked Ethiopia’s port needs to access the sea. On January 1, the Somaliland President announced that an agreement had been reached that Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland as an independent state in exchange for providing Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden. On January 3, Ethiopia stated that “evaluations are being made regarding steps that could be taken for Somaliland’s recognition,” indicating that there is not yet official recognition. The agreement envisions Somaliland leasing a 20-kilometer coastal strip to Ethiopia for 50 years. This lease also allows Ethiopia to build a military naval base and commercial port. Thus, Ethiopia finds an opportunity to access the strategically important Gulf of Aden through a new port that is not as busy as Djibouti. Indeed, countries like Turkey, France, US, China, Japan, Germany, and Italy have military naval bases in Djibouti.
The Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement includes cooperation areas such as Ethiopia investing in the Port of Berbera as well as developing a trade corridor extending from Wajaale on the Ethiopian border to the Port of Berbera. Additionally, giving Somaliland shares in Ethiopian Airlines and cooperation in military matters are also part of the agreement. However, the most important and still questionable part is whether Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland’s independence under this agreement. The recent discovery of oil resources in Somaliland’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) makes the issue even more important.
Although the agreement was positively received in Somaliland, it is interesting that Somaliland’s defense minister resigned on the grounds that “accepting Ethiopian soldiers into Somaliland territory would pose a problem for national security.” This agreement is quite critical and disturbing for Somalia. It can be thought that this agreement with Turkey made just one month after the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement sends a message to Ethiopia and signals that Somalia’s territorial integrity cannot be easily challenged. However, the Somali President expressed that this agreement with Turkey had been worked on for a long time and that the announcement of the two agreements on such close dates was a coincidence. He also stated that it was not made with the intention of creating feelings of hatred or hostility in any other country.
Regional Dynamics and Global Balances
Ethiopia is an important regional power that wants to increase its power even more in the Horn of Africa. For Ethiopia, which lost its sea access after Eritrea’s separation in 1993, sea access is an important economic and strategic need to increase its regional power. Ethiopia has been using Djibouti ports for a long time to access the sea, but this is known to create an annual cost of around 1 billion dollars for Ethiopia. With the agreement made with Somaliland, Ethiopia will access the Red Sea from the Port of Berbera both more cheaply and more reliably.
The fact that Ethiopian soldiers have a majority in the peacekeeping force in Somalia makes this agreement even more critical in terms of Ethiopia-Somalia relations and Somalia’s security. On the other hand, Egypt, which has problems with Ethiopia regarding the use of Nile waters, does not want any regional competition environment to form in the Red Sea and sees this agreement with Somaliland as part of Ethiopia’s efforts to destabilize the region and its hegemonic ambitions. Additionally, Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland, which is a reflection of its effort to increase its regional power and effectiveness, has the potential to bring old tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia back to the surface. It is known that Eritrea has been trying to get closer to Somalia recently.
The African Union also expressed its concerns after this agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia and stated that it wants parties not to cause any tension and escalation. There are concerns about increasing instability and creating a conflict environment in the Horn of Africa after Sub-Saharan Africa, which has already been destabilized by many coups in the past few years. It is known that these coup administrations that came to power in Sub-Saharan African countries have close relations especially with the Russian Wagner Group and have given Russia influence in this area. The Turkey-Somalia agreement likely satisfies these countries as a balancing element against the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement, which creates a risk for the US and Britain, which have invested in Somalia’s stability. In this context, US Senator Jeanne Shaheen, who visited Turkey at the end of February, said they discussed “cooperation in Africa” with the President in Ankara and added: “Turkey has relations in Africa that the US doesn’t have, so we can work together not only for countries there but also for world stability in important areas”. The timing of this discourse is quite meaningful and proves that the US is satisfied with our cooperation with Somalia.
Additionally, considering the tense situation in the Middle East and the Palestine-Israel conflict, regional developments that would feed the instability already caused by the Houthis in Yemen in the Gulf of Aden will not be welcomed in the West (especially the US). The US, which has good relations with Somalia, will prefer a Somalia that is close to it and easily controllable at the entrance of the Red Sea over an Ethiopia that increases its dominance in the region with its strong and hegemonic ambitions. On the other hand, it’s possible that the US is looking for new alternatives besides its base in Djibouti to increase its presence against the Houthis in Yemen. It is known that in recent years, the US expressed intention to use Somaliland’s Port of Berbera and airport for operations against Al-Shabaab. Although the US made its visits to the Port of Berbera in communication with the Somali government, these visits might be seen by Somaliland as a development that will strengthen its sovereignty. Undoubtedly, the US establishing a base at the Port of Berbera would create an alternative to increasingly crowded Djibouti from the US perspective.
A conflict between Somalia-Somaliland-Ethiopia in the region could not only damage the US’s cooperation with Somalia against Al-Shabaab but also negatively affect commercial ship traffic in the already troubled Gulf of Aden and global trade. Therefore, the US will want to use various diplomatic and financial tools to reduce such a conflict risk. Considering its deterrent potential against such a conflict in the region, “to what extent the Turkey-Somalia agreement serves US interests” is a connection worth questioning.
Somalia is actually a country where many actors have changing interests, and these actors use their relations with Somalia to increase their power and influence in the region. The Somalia Consultation Group (Somalia Quint), formed by Turkey, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, US and Britain, cooperates for ensuring security and stability in Somalia, and the fifth meeting of this group was held in Abu Dhabi in February 2024. It’s possible to assume that this quintet is uncomfortable with the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement, as the general approach is towards preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity. Additionally, Britain also expressed its discomfort with this agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The Arab League, led by Egypt, also supports Somalia’s territorial integrity. Additionally, we need to consider Egypt’s bilateral relations with Ethiopia, which are tense due to certain disagreements. However, Dubai-based DP World company, which has investments in the Port of Berbera in the Somaliland region, expressed interest in continuing to develop this port together with Ethiopia and Somaliland. This is also an indication that the UAE might change its policy towards Somaliland and the Arab League.
The Somalia-Turkey agreement will significantly strengthen Turkey’s power and presence in the region, where Turkey already has significant influence. Turkey, which has had good relations with Somalia for a long time, has been providing training and technical support to Somali armed forces at the TÜRKSOM base in Mogadishu since 2012. Additionally, the management of Mogadishu airport and port belongs to the Albayrak Group, known for its closeness to the AKP government.
However, it is also known that Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia. Turkey had sold Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs to Ethiopia in 2021. It had come to the agenda that these weapon systems were used against rebels in the Tigray region and caused civilian deaths in some regions, and it was reflected in the media that the US was uncomfortable with the sale of such weapons to Ethiopia.
It is possible that these developments in the region will bring Somalia and Egypt closer together to balance Ethiopia, at least it was so before the Turkey-Somalia agreement. After this agreement, Egypt may not feel the need to make an active move to deter Ethiopia. At the same time, the relative normalization between Egypt and Turkey will also reduce the possibility of Egypt being uncomfortable with this agreement we made with Somalia. We can say that the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement has created serious discomfort in Djibouti. For Djibouti, which has long been mediating between Somaliland and the Somali government, a potential conflict in the region has the risk of disrupting the social structure in regional countries that are demographically quite connected to each other, in addition to military and economic reflections. Against the destabilizing effect of the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement, the Turkey-Somalia agreement has the potential to both contribute to counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, play a deterrent role against regional instability and conflict risk, and prevent the disruption of the state-building process in Somalia.
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Turkey
First, I would like to state that evaluating the moral dimensions of the agreement in question is not the subject of this article. It is possible to look critically at Turkey’s exploration, extraction, and processing of Somalia’s valuable hydrocarbon resources from a neo-colonial or imperialist perspective. The agreement gives Turkey certain privileges regarding the extraction, processing, and use of its natural resources in return for Turkey helping Somalia with military support and capacity building in certain areas. From this perspective, we can also assume that it is an agreement signed between two governments in accordance with their national interests and that this is a simple diplomatic exchange.
Economic Effects
– This agreement with Somalia will develop Turkey-Somalia relations and further increase the economic and commercial privileges already obtained from Somalia.
– For example, giving new infrastructure projects to Turkish companies,
– Turkish companies getting shares in different important areas outside the port and airport currently managed by the Albayrak Group
– Giving Turkey a share of resources to be extracted from Somalia’s EEZ, especially oil, natural gas, and fishing, or giving Turkey permission to extract these resources
– Increasing trade volume between the two countries and selling Turkish-produced weapons and equipment to Somalia, especially in the defense industry
– On the other hand, considering the current economic crisis in Turkey, we should also evaluate what impact military expenditures to fulfill the terms of this agreement will have on the Turkish economy.
Geopolitical Effects
– This agreement will increase Turkey’s military presence and power in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and contribute to Turkey’s regional power projection.
– The Turkish Naval Forces will undoubtedly gain important experiences from executing an important mission in a region so far from the homeland.
– However, risks created by deploying a significant portion of our military capabilities and naval elements, which are already limited and numerically insufficient compared to the size of the water mass surrounding our country, in a region so far from the homeland should not be ignored. Especially considering the presence of disputed regions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war in the Black Sea.
– With this agreement, Turkey contributes to Somalia’s security and becomes a deterrent force against potential external interventions against Somalia. Thus, it becomes an actor contributing to peace and stability in Somalia and the region.
– However, in the Somalia-Somaliland-Ethiopia triangle, especially considering the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement, the risk of Turkey becoming part of this conflict in case of a potential conflict poses a great danger. The risk of the Palestine-Israel conflict still spreading regionally and the possibility of Yemen becoming fully involved in the war make the Gulf of Aden a risky region. Additionally, Houthi attacks on commercial ships continue intermittently. In short, we are guaranteeing to protect territorial waters with our own ships for 10 years to deter attacks on the sovereignty of an unstable country whose territorial integrity is threatened in a highly unstable region.
– This agreement, which envisions Turkey protecting Somali territorial waters and preventing illegal maritime activities, also risks bringing Turkey diplomatically face to face with some countries. For example, it is known that Pakistan and Iran conduct illegal fishing activities in Somalia’s EEZ. In such cases, the Turkish Naval Forces will intervene with these countries’ fishing vessels within the framework of the agreement made with Somalia. The possibility of these interventions causing any problems between Turkey and third countries should be evaluated in detail.
– On March 31, the administration in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, announced that it had withdrawn from Somalia’s federal system and would govern itself independently until necessary constitutional changes were made. Puntland’s move came on top of the constitutional amendment made in Mogadishu in recent weeks. The changes further centralize executive power and include powers such as the president being elected by direct elections and being able to appoint the prime minister without parliamentary approval. Puntland announced that it would act independently until a constitution approved by a federal referendum in which they would participate is made. This situation, following Somaliland, casts a shadow on the authority of the Mogadishu government and brings Somalia very close to becoming a failed state, if not making it one.
Diplomatic Effects
– Within the framework of this agreement, Turkey will further elevate its diplomatic relations with Somalia. Although we cannot say that Somalia is a very effective diplomatic actor in the international arena, we can say that it will be a factor that will ensure it acts in line with Turkey’s interests in areas such as the UN General Assembly and African Union.
– Considering US Senator Jeanne Shaheen’s statement during her visit to Turkey in recent weeks that Turkey has relations in Africa that the US doesn’t have, saying “We can work together in areas that will be important not only for these countries but also for world stability” along with US policy in the Horn of Africa in general, we can say that Turkey’s agreement with Somalia is welcomed and perhaps even encouraged by the US. It is possible to say that the Somalia-Turkey agreement, which also serves US interests, will have a positive effect on relations with the US as it comes at a time when we are in the process of repairing relations. Its positive effect on relations with the US (and perhaps the West) may potentially provide economic contributions to Turkey in the long term – if other conditions are met – (such as the much-desired direct foreign investment from the West, etc.).
– On the other hand, claims that this agreement, which will undoubtedly contribute to securing US interests, is a sub-imperialist movement serving American imperialism are also expressed by some experts. Aside from the moral aspect of this situation, we need to consider the risk, albeit small, of Turkey being labeled as a practitioner of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (Neo-Ottomanism) or sub-imperialism in the international arena. We had experienced similar problems before due to our military presence in Libya and Syria.
Conclusion
In light of all this information, we can say that this agreement, which offers many advantages in military, economic, and diplomatic areas, has some “low probability but high cost” risks, particularly in the military dimension. If these high-cost risks can be eliminated or minimized, the current agreement can be considered beneficial for Turkey in terms of increasing its regional and global effectiveness, providing various economic contributions, increasing military power projection, enhancing exports and production in the military field, contributing to relations with the West, and increasing its role in global diplomacy. For example, economic advantages appear quite beneficial considering various areas such as utilizing or receiving shares from underwater resources in Somalia, developing commercial relations between the two countries, various commercial/economic privileges Turkey will obtain in Somalia, Turkey’s construction of the Somali navy, and UAV/UCAV sales.
While receiving potential benefits from this agreement, efforts should be made to identify and exclude some areas that could pose risks for Turkey in future sub-protocols of the agreement (if such a method will be followed) to avoid risks as much as possible. It is particularly necessary to stay away from commitments that could cause Turkey to unwillingly become part of a regional conflict. Turkey’s duty to protect Somali territorial waters should be limited to just that, and Turkish Land Forces should not be deployed to Somali territory as a combatant force except for training and consultancy activities, and no connection should be made to issues such as protecting Somalia’s land borders and territorial integrity.
It is clear that a new motion must be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the approval of this agreement, which is not covered by the motion dated January 17, 2024, that was approved by the TBMM, and for the assignment of the Turkish Armed Forces. If this motion is approved, the TBMM’s role in effective control and oversight over our forces to be deployed in Somalia will be a significant factor in mitigating the mentioned risks.
Ultimately, we must be aware of the risks that come with this agreement, which will bring significant benefits to Turkey. Over the last few years, global tension and the risk of conflict have engulfed the world, and we can predict that this trend will increase rather than decrease over the next decade. Predicting what these risks, which do not seem very high today, will look like by 2034 is not easy. In an unpredictable world, ten years is by no means a short time for significant changes to occur. In such a scenario, Turkey must be prepared for unexpected changes in the region and the world and should make its choices carefully.
Somaliland was a British colony from 1884, while the remaining parts of present-day Somalia were under Italian colonial rule. After gaining independence in 1960, the two regions united but separated again following the Somali Civil War in 1991. However, the separatist Somaliland administration has not gained any international recognition and is still considered de jure part of Somalia.
