Hybrid Warfare
As the Ukraine War completes its third year, the situation at the front has largely turned into a war of attrition. While Russia is making progress on the eastern front, Ukraine is trying to strengthen its strategic defense lines. However, this war is not just a conventional front struggle; it functions as a laboratory where hybrid warfare is being tested. In this context, it is necessary to reassess the validity of the frequently cited Gerasimov Doctrine in Ukraine.
Let’s start the article by contradicting ourselves. There is no such thing as the Gerasimov Doctrine. This concept does not appear in Russia’s official military literature. The term emerged when Western security expert Mark Galeotti translated a speech by Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in 2013 and called it the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” After the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas War in 2014, this concept became used to define Russia’s understanding of hybrid warfare. Years later, Galeotti himself emphasized in an article in Foreign Policy that this term led to misunderstandings and that Russian military strategy is more complex than this conceptualization.
You might ask, “Then why did you use this term at the beginning of your article?” Undoubtedly for the same reason as Galeotti: to attract attention. But there’s more to it. Concepts that are produced often develop, transform, and become filled with content in ways different from what was originally intended. Therefore, the “Gerasimov Doctrine” is not just about the General’s article or Galeotti’s wordplay.
The Gerasimov Doctrine has now become a framework used to understand Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy. It can even be called a synthesis of what has been written about the war doctrines and modern military strategies of the Russian Armed Forces. In Gerasimov’s article, we see traces of studies on “hybrid warfare” and “non-contact warfare” by military strategists known in Russian military literature under the pseudonyms “V.I. Chekinov” and “S.A. Bogdanov.”
Let’s take a look: Shaping public opinion with propaganda and disinformation and creating division in enemy society… Conducting cyber attacks, economic pressure, and operations with unrecognized elements (“little green men”)… Creating internal turmoil by supporting separatist movements. Combining the regular army with mercenaries (Wagner Group) and special forces… Achieving indirect victory by supporting military moves with political and economic goals… This vision, which blends Cold War-era intelligence tactics (maskirovka and “active measures”) with 21st-century technology, was impressive in theory. The dynamics of the war in Ukraine show that these principles have been successful in some areas but have remained limited in effect.
First of all, in terms of information warfare, Russia has achieved significant success in consolidating its own domestic public opinion. At this point, Ukraine’s offensive has reshaped Russia’s internal narrative. Ukraine’s entry into Kursk caused an uproar among the Russian people, with nearly 200,000 people forced to flee. However, with the help of this “terrorism” narrative, Putin maintains his near-absolute approval rating. The Kremlin’s media control and anti-Western narratives have ensured that a large portion of the Russian people continue to support the war. However, the same strategy did not work in Ukraine and the West. The Russian propaganda apparatus’s narrative that “The West is staging a coup in Ukraine” resulted in the Ukrainian people uniting. Russia, which had achieved quick gains by manipulating the people in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, could not show the same effect in post-2022 occupations. The Ukrainian people united against the occupation and largely thwarted Russia’s information operations.
The tactic of manipulating the local population to create internal turmoil and supporting separatist movements, which had been successful in 2014, largely became ineffective after 2022 due to resistance in Ukraine. The bloodless annexation of Crimea through “little green men” and propaganda, and the emergence of “people’s republics” from separatist movements in Donbas, were seen as the greatest successes of hybrid tactics. However, during the large-scale invasion process, the failure of pro-Russian movements in Ukraine to create an impact at the expected level revealed the limits of this strategy. Referendums were held in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, but local support could not exceed 15%. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people continue to unite in the face of occupation. The same is true on the other side of the coin: people in Kursk did not embrace Ukraine; unlike Crimea, only ruins remained.
The use of mercenaries and special forces, one of the main pillars of hybrid warfare, achieved partial successes but was not sufficient for the Russian army to sustain a large-scale invasion. The Wagner Group had achieved tactical victories in Bakhmut in 2023. In recent weeks, nearly 10,000 soldiers from North Korea were deployed in Kursk. However, we see that these elements were insufficient in the large-scale war, half of the Korean soldiers were killed, and some even fled and withdrew. Similarly, Wagner’s rebellion against the Kremlin under Prigozhin’s leadership in 2023 reveals the fragility of the hybrid structure.
Moreover, hybrid warfare approaches envisaged supporting military operations with political and economic moves. In the Ukraine example, it is clear that Russia has struggled to implement this strategy. The heavy costs of conventional war and the impact of sanctions on the economy made it difficult for Russia to support its hybrid warfare strategy. Indicators such as Russia’s 23% interest rate and 9% inflation show that hybrid warfare cannot compensate for internal weaknesses.
As we mentioned at the beginning of the article, the war in Ukraine has turned into a war of attrition. Although Russia has made progress on some fronts, these gains were achieved at the cost of great losses. While measurements of Russian casualties vary, the vast majority of figures exceeding half a million show that hybrid methods have not reduced the cost of conventional warfare. Moreover, Ukraine’s intensive military and economic support from the West nullifies the hybrid warfare-centered strategies’ understanding of winning victory through indirect methods. Aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war has exceeded $120 billion. Europe’s LNG imports and renewable energy transition initiatives have also reduced dependence on Russia to below 10%. Therefore, hybrid methods have dealt tactical blows to the West, but have not brought about a strategic collapse.
The biggest strategic failure was Russia’s inability to cut Western support for Ukraine. Like in hybrid warfare strategies in general, Gerasimov envisaged a model aimed at weakening the enemy from within. Just last week, Russian attacks on energy networks in Odesa and Poltava left 2 million people without electricity. However, European countries are neutralizing this Russian strategy by reducing their energy dependencies and strengthening solidarity within NATO. We can concretize the West’s strategy against the hybrid threat with examples such as Starlink, Microsoft’s cyber support, and Europe’s SkyShield project.
Although some tactical successes have been achieved, such as the annexation of Crimea and attacks on energy infrastructure, it is clear that as of 2025, this strategy has not provided a strategic victory in the Ukraine war. The hybrid warfare methods that were successful in Crimea in 2014 did not yield the same result in a large-scale invasion.
This situation reveals the fundamental weaknesses of centralizing a hybrid strategy: Hybrid warfare methods can only be effective with the support of the local population and in situations where the enemy’s resistance capacity is low. In Ukraine, the opposite happened. Russia’s hybrid warfare moves led to the unification of the Ukrainian people, more support from the West, and the transformation of the war into a conventional attrition process.
After Ukraine’s unexpected offensive in the Kursk region last August, Russia largely regained control. It would not be wrong to call Kursk a microcosm of hybrid warfare. The logistical lines around Sudzha, the largest settlement held by Ukraine in Kursk, were destroyed by Russian attacks. The Russians conducted a raid using the gas pipeline near Sudzha and cut Ukraine’s main supply route. However, Ukraine’s withdrawal from Kursk does not prove that hybrid methods remain in the shadow of conventional warfare. It is useful to differentiate Russian success at this point. Russia disabled Ukraine’s electronic warfare systems with fiber optic drones, but it was the infantry and artillery units that captured Sudzha within three days; hybrid methods supported them but did not win the battle. Trump’s suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine resulted in Russia taking Sudzha within 48 hours. Yes, cutting off aid put Kyiv in a difficult position, but this was a policy of the White House rather than the Kremlin’s tactical intelligence.
In conclusion, the Ukraine War shows us the limits of hybrid warfare. The hybrid warfare tactics that brought success in Crimea in 2014 could not show the same effect in a large-scale military intervention. Russia’s hybrid strategy conducted through information warfare, cyber attacks, and separatist movements did not create the expected effect due to the resistance of the Ukrainian people and the support of the West. Therefore, hybrid warfare is decisive only in situations where the enemy’s internal resistance capacity is low and local support is high. In the current state of the war, Russian success reflects Russia’s chaotic and pragmatic approach, not the idea of “pre-war groundwork.” The Kursk case, in particular, shows us that hybrid methods are supportive, while victory comes with conventional power.
