Syria recently witnessed a rapid unraveling of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the face of the Syrian army. The swift collapse of this structure, which had been supported for years, was likely a development very few expected.
Following the revolution on December 8, 2024, and the fall of the Baath regime, Syria began a process of transformation toward a new order. In line with this process, an agreement was signed on March 10, 2025, following negotiations between the new regime in Damascus and the SDF. This agreement was based on several key pillars: a ceasefire, non-discrimination, Kurdish representation, the integration of civil and military structures in SDF-controlled areas into the state, and the return of those forced to flee their homes during the civil war.
As we approach the end of 2025, this agreement has largely remained on paper. Despite U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Representative for Syria Tom Barrack repeatedly emphasizing the importance of Syria’s territorial integrity, the SDF leadership refused to take serious steps toward integration with Damascus.
Once the deadline given to the non-compliant SDF expired, the Syrian army’s operation—which began in Aleppo—expanded rapidly, and the SDF quickly lost the territories it held. During this time, the SDF was not only abandoned by the U.S. and Israel but also completely disintegrated as the Arab tribes within its ranks defected. These tribes joined the Syrian army, leaving the YPG trapped around Kobani (Ayn al-Arab), Hasakah, and Qamishli.
A new agreement was signed on January 18, 2026. This time, the agreement contained strict provisions for a ceasefire and full integration. The YPG would withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. YPG militants would be integrated into the army on an individual basis. Civilian institutions in Hasakah would be directly integrated into the state. YPG military elements would leave Kobani, where security would be provided by a local police force under the Syrian Ministry of Interior. And these provinces could be governed by governors proposed by the YPG.
With this agreement, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (also known as Rojava) officially comes to an end, and the Syrian state establishes full sovereignty over its territory. However, it should be noted that tensions rose again on January 19 when Mazlum Abdi refused to accept the deal, but through U.S. mediation, Damascus granted the YPG a four-day grace period.
The Collapse of a Paper Tiger Proxy
For years, the Turkish public has heard about the YPG’s “100,000-strong army,” armed by the international coalition, led by the U.S., across the border. The existence of the YPG emboldened various parties, from Qandil in Iraq to the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. Furthermore, they turned their struggle against ISIS into an epic saga, using it as a primary propaganda tool abroad. Despite this, when the moment came for the YPG to demonstrate its strength, we saw this 100,000-man army virtually evaporate.
Even American officials now admit that the YPG’s struggle against ISIS was exaggerated, though this is not the first time such an admission has been made. We know from John Bolton’s White House memoirs that Donald Trump said: “I don’t like the Kurds. They run from the Iraqis, they run from the Turks. the only time they don’t run is when we’re bombing all around them with F-18s.”
Despite this, the U.S. continued to back the YPG for a long time, calling them a vital ally in the fight against ISIS. The reality of Trump’s words was proven during the Syrian army’s offensive. Indeed, it was watched almost live as YPG militants scattered and fled when the U.S. Air Force was not on the field.
One of the YPG’s greatest mistakes was a blind devotion to the tunnel strategy of the Vietnam resistance, which they had admired during their Marxist-Leninist period. While tunnels can achieve some success in the mountainous regions of Northern Iraq, the tunnel systems built over a decade at great expense in the Syrian plains failed completely. This geographical doctrinal mismatch had shown itself before. During Operation Olive Branch, YPG militants clashing with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Afrin had already faced the failure of tunnels, yet they refused to accept this reality and continued to expand them.
All these resources could have been spent on the development of Rojava. In areas where the SDF withdrew, it was seen that the wreckage from the early years of the civil war remained untouched; the SDF had not made even the slightest investment in the region. This led to a total lack of civil services that might have somewhat satisfied a local population already subjected to ethnic cleansing and heavy pressure. Footage circulated online showing people in villages entered by the Syrian army welcoming the soldiers with joy.
Delusion and Defeat
Perhaps the YPG’s greatest error of all was failing to read the changing global context and American politics. With Trump’s second term, MAGA brought a significant paradigm shift to U.S. foreign policy. The SDF was now an antique left over from the Democratic Party and the old paradigm, and Trump was intent on cutting the money spent on Syria for years. Tom Barrack’s words were not taken seriously, even though it was obvious that Barrack is a close friend of Trump and his words were effectively Trump’s own.
The YPG did not accept this; on the contrary, they believed Israel would back them due to deteriorating Turkey-Israel relations. Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, the repeated bombing of Damascus, and even the striking of a Turkish air defense system sent to Damascus further emboldened the YPG.
What the YPG failed to foresee was Trump’s success in transactional diplomacy, being a businessman at heart. Trump was prone to crafting “win-win” deals, and bringing Al-Shara and Netanyahu to the same table to reach an agreement on the fate of the border region was enough for Israel to withdraw its support. Thus, the YPG was left completely alone in northeastern Syria.
Another critical mistake by the YPG is its call for Kurds in Turkey to join the resistance. Any unrest in Turkey resulting from this call provides sufficient justification for the TAF—which has stayed off the field so far—to intervene in the region. Consequently, the more the YPG struggles, the deeper it sinks.
In Conclusion
As of this writing, the four-day period granted by Damascus to the YPG has not yet expired. According to open-source data, militants from both Northern Iraq and PJAK in Iran are descending into the Hasakah region to prepare for its defense. This indicates they have not yet accepted the implementation of the agreement.
Conversely, open sources show that Damascus is also massing troops in the region. Given that the YPG no longer has a land route to send militants to Kobani, there are serious signs that blood will be shed primarily for Hasakah and Qamishli.
In the Middle East, the days change, but war never changes.
