It is possible to divide the course of Africa-Turkey relations, which extends from the Ottoman period to the present day, into two periods. After the Ottoman Empire’s long-term control of power in the continent, following the empire’s dissolution, there was an observable decline in relations after the establishment of the Republic compared to other periods. It would not be wrong to say that the first period of Turkey’s relations with the continent extends up to 1998.¹
After the end of the Cold War, in the early 2000s, Turkey’s strategic importance for the West was observed to gradually decrease. During the same period, Turkey’s rejection for EU membership at the 1997 EU Summit led the country to seek a multi-dimensional foreign policy. After the adoption of the “Africa Opening Action Plan” in 1998, the 1999 Marmara earthquake and the subsequent 2001 economic crisis, along with political instability, caused a short-term pause in Turkey’s foreign policy. The strengthening of Turkey’s relations with Africa developed immediately after the elections in the country. With the Justice and Development Party winning the election, Turkey-Africa relations began to strengthen progressively. Turkey-Africa relations, which completed its first period with the “Africa Opening Action Plan,” entered its second period more strongly with the Justice and Development Party coming to power. Indeed, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) opening its first office on the continent in Ethiopia in 2005 and the designation of this year as the “Year of Africa” in Turkey was a clear indication of this.¹
Practical Applications and Results of Turkey’s Soft Power
Turkey gained a significant opportunity to implement its Africa Policy, which it based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, both institutionally and socially in 2005. As a first step, after being accepted as an observer to the African Union in that year, it was accepted by union members as a strategic partner in January 2008. Following the implementation of the Africa Strategy Document in 2010, Turkey made significant progress in its Africa initiative, and relations with African countries accelerated significantly. As a result, in 2013, the Africa Partnership Policy replaced the Africa Opening Policy. During this process, sharing Turkey’s experience, social, political and cultural accumulation, and available resources and opportunities with African governments and peoples has been one of the main objectives of this policy.²
Thanks to the soft power implemented, with the support of African countries, Turkey was elected as a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council for the first time in 2010. Istanbul hosted the third Turkey-Africa Summit in 2021, following the second one held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in 2014. At this summit, frameworks were established for planned future political and economic partnerships.² The fourth Partnership Summit was held in Istanbul on October 12-13, 2023, with the participation of the African Union Term President, Comoros President Azali Assoumani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, organized by DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board).³
Turkey’s soft power has manifested itself in export and import rates with African countries. Particularly, the significant difference in exports has proven Turkey’s success in relations with Africa during the second period. The table below shows Turkey’s export and import amounts between 2010-2023.³
Table 1: Turkey’s Exports to North African Countries in 2010 and 2023. Unit: US Dollars – thousand
Source: (Gürel, A., & İren, A. A. 2024).
Table 2: Turkey’s Imports from North African Countries in 2010 and 2023. Unit: US Dollars – thousand
Source: (Gürel, A., & İren, A. A. 2024).
Turkey’s Military Impact in the Region and Its Consequences
Despite Turkey’s lack of extensive experience in exporting domestic weapons, after the Karabakh war, these weapons began to gain significant popularity in Africa, and Turkey gradually gained power in arms supply on the African continent.⁴
An agreement on defense and economic cooperation was reached and mutually signed between Turkey and Somalia in 2024. In his statement, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stated that this agreement aims to build the Somali navy, utilize natural resources in Somali waters, and protect them from illegal activities stemming from pirates, drug-arms trafficking, and terrorism. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud emphasized in his statement that the areas determined by this agreement would be under Turkey’s control for a 10-year period, and after the specified period ends, Somali security forces would resume these duties.⁴
In addition to all these, Turkey signed three different mutual agreements with Djibouti in February 2024, including protocols on military training cooperation, military financial cooperation, and implementation of cash assistance. Furthermore, in recent periods, Turkey has made significant arms exports to the Horn of Africa countries. The Somali state has carried out successful operations against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab movement with the UAV provided by the Bayraktar company. Some international sources stated that Turkish UAVs produced by Bayraktar were actively used by Ethiopian federal forces in the war with Tigray.⁴
Due to the increasing military and economic influence of Turkey over African states, African states are turning to Turkey’s mediation in disputes among themselves. Ethiopia, which had tension with Somalia for many years, officially requested President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to mediate in resolving the issue after failing to achieve results from discussions held in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, on March 9-10. Both states’ trust in Turkey as a mediator has been the fruit of the strategies implemented regarding Africa.⁵
Conclusion and Evaluation
As a result of Turkey’s second-period Africa policy, the country has not only exhibited significant change in foreign policy but also created a more comprehensive sphere of influence by going beyond traditional diplomacy. Turkey has brought together the necessary political, economic, and cultural elements to become a key player in Africa. The opening of diplomatic missions and directing Turkish businessmen to the region has helped Turkey establish strong ties on this continent.
We must not forget that different stability levels and cultural backgrounds of countries in the African continent may make it difficult for Turkey to achieve its goals. We should not ignore the difficulty of establishing sustainable partnerships with these states that have remained under Western colonization for many years and whose languages have been assimilated by imperialist powers.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s attempts to position itself as a bridge between Africa and other states of the world in this foreign policy should be evaluated positively. Particularly, China’s recent inclusion of Africa in its belt and road project is an indication of how correct Turkey’s foreign policy is.
*This article is summarized from Yu Haijie’s article titled “Turkey’s Multidimensional Strategy for Africa: Characteristics, Basic Motives, and Future Expectations” published in BRIQ Belt and Road Initiative Journal in 2024.
References
- Oruç, A. (2022). Evaluation of Turkey’s Africa strategy in the context of foreign economic relations and recommendations (Expertise Thesis). ISEDAK and International Development Cooperation General Directorate.
- Oğurlu, E. (2018). Turkey’s Africa Experience in the Period 1998-2018: A Transformation from Idea to Action. Eurasian Studies, 54(2), 65-94.
- Gürel, A., & İren, A. A. (2024). TURKEY’S NEOLIBERAL POLICIES IN NORTH AFRICA AND CHANGING HEGEMONY. Mediterranean Basin and African Civilizations Journal, 6(1), 21-41.
- Anadolu Agency. (2024, October 10). Turkey is increasing its influence in the Horn of Africa day by day https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/turkiye-afrika-boynuzunda-nufuzunu-gunbegun-artiriyor/3349958
- BBC Turkish. (2024, August 13). Somalia-Ethiopia talks: How did Turkey become a mediator, can the problem be solved? https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cpw8xl54vj4o
