The statement by Moldovan President Maia Sandu that she would vote in favor of a referendum on the unification of Moldova and Romania has sparked public debate. This unification, which has been attempted and discussed before by the peoples of both countries, is also of critical importance with regard to the status of the Gagauzia region within Moldova. The Gagauz are Christian Turks who speak the Turkic dialect closest to Türkiye Turkish. In the event of a Moldova-Romania unification, Moldova’s state status would change, which would grant Gagauzia the right to hold a plebiscite and, consequently, to obtain independence. If the Republic of Türkiye, acting within the logic of a Turkish sphere of influence, stands by its Gagauz kin, prepares the necessary infrastructure, and convinces the Gagauz people-under Türkiye’s leadership-to pursue independence, it would not only pioneer the establishment of the first Turkish state in Europe but also increase its power in the Black Sea. The aim of this article is to examine the Moldova-Romania unification issue through its historical background and to explain what Türkiye’s interests would be, and what it should do, in the event of unification.
The History of Moldova-Romania Unification
The territory of today’s Moldova was once part of the Principality of Moldavia. The language spoken was Romanian, and the region shared common elites and culture. This demonstrates that there were not two separate nations inhabiting this geography. In 1812, Tsarist Russia seized Bessarabia-modern-day Moldova-from the Ottoman Empire. This led to the physical separation of the region from Romania. In addition, under Tsarist Russification policies, efforts were made to gradually fragment the shared identity. However, among the population, the perception of “We are Romanian” never completely disappeared.
After World War I and the collapse of Tsarist Russia, Bessarabia joined Romania through a referendum and functioned as a single state between 1918 and 1940. In 1940, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the USSR occupied Bessarabia and established the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. After this occupation, the Soviets invented a separate “Moldovan” identity and a distinct “Moldovan language,” banned the Latin alphabet, and suppressed Moldova’s ties with Romania.
With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Moldova became independent. Following independence, Moldova rejected the Soviet-imposed identity, reinstated Romanian as the official language, and the idea of unification with Romania re-emerged. However, the outbreak of the Transnistria War and Russia’s intervention prevented concrete steps toward unification. In the early 2000s, Romania’s accession to the European Union, Moldova’s increasing poverty, and the fact that many young Moldovans held Romanian passports created a situation of de facto integration. After 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine placed the unification idea on a security and geopolitical foundation.
The primary reason the unification issue has come to the forefront today is the war in Ukraine. One reason is Moldova’s desire to enter NATO’s security umbrella due to Russia’s aggressive policies. Moldova cannot join NATO because of the Transnistria issue. Romania’s NATO membership makes unification more attractive, as Moldova would then fall under the same security umbrella. If unification occurs, the likelihood that Russia would recognize Transnistria-currently unrecognized by any country on the grounds that NATO would otherwise border it increases. However, Russia’s entanglement in the Ukraine war and its reduced capacity to protect its allies create an opportunity for Moldova and Romania to pursue unification. Although some segments of Moldovan society oppose unification, it is believed that a potential referendum would not yield a negative result, given that nearly half of the population already holds Romanian citizenship.
The Status of Gagauzia in the Event of Unification
The Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, adopted by the Moldovan Parliament in 1994, stipulates that if Moldova loses its independence or if its status changes, Gagauzia may exercise its right to self-determination. Since unification would constitute a change in status, Gagauzia’s legal right to hold a plebiscite (referendum) would be activated. In this case, Gagauzia would face two options: unification with Romania or declaration of independence.
From the perspective of international law, this would not constitute unilateral secession, but rather an example of self-determination following the dissolution of a state. This argument can be supported by precedents such as Kosovo, the dissolution of the USSR, and the separation of Czechoslovakia. The key distinction here is that it would not be Gagauzia seceding, but Moldova unifying with another state.
The possibility of Gagauzia declaring independence must be evaluated not only through local and international law, but also through geopolitical realities. Therefore, the positions of Romania and Russia are of critical importance. Gagauzia is not historically Romanian territory and shares no cultural or ethnic ties with Romania. In the event of unification, forcibly attaching Gagauzia to Romania would be unlikely due to EU law, minority rights, and international public reaction. As such, Romania would likely accept a referendum or attempt to slow the process.
Russia, concerned that Moldova’s unification with Romania would lead to NATO membership, may seek to use Gagauzia as leverage. However, due to geographic limitations, direct annexation would not be easy. To prevent Gagauzia from becoming another Transnistria under Russian intervention, Türkiye’s role and leadership are crucial. Otherwise, a Transnistria-like situation in Gagauzia remains a realistic possibility.
What Do the Gagauz Think About Unification?
The official political line in Gagauzia currently advocates preserving and expanding autonomy within Moldova rather than pursuing outright independence. The primary reason for this stance is limited economic capacity. However, in the event of a Romania-Moldova unification, Romania’s unitary state structure would likely result in the loss of autonomy rights and raise fears of identity erosion. For this reason, Gagauzia is expected to invoke the rights granted by the 1994 arrangement. Although fear of isolation following independence is a factor, this concern could be mitigated through Türkiye’s assumption of responsibility.
What Should the Republic of Türkiye Do?
At the initial stage, it should be acknowledged that Russia maintains influence in the region, and that one of the main sources of this influence is the Gagauz community’s affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. In this context, the relationship between the Gagauz people and the Moscow Patriarchate should be gradually repositioned into a framework where Türkiye can establish healthier and more sustainable ties through long-term and well-planned soft power instruments. By creating alternative channels of engagement in religious and cultural domains, Türkiye should aim to progressively distance Gagauz society from Moscow-centered spheres of influence. In this process, relevant state institutions, particularly TİKA, should carry out coordinated and strategic soft power activities in the region through cultural, social, and community-based projects.
Following Moldova-Romania unification, Türkiye should openly defend Gagauzia’s right to self-determination before the international community, frame the unification as annexation, and invoke the Kosovo precedent. This would demonstrate the legal legitimacy of the process.
While advocating for the legal status internationally, Türkiye should simultaneously help establish Gagauzia’s state-building infrastructure. Even if unofficially, ministries of foreign affairs, finance, and internal security should be formed; personnel should be trained in Türkiye; and Türkiye should provide advisory support.
Direct military deployment by Türkiye would pose risks in terms of EU and Russian balances. Instead, Türkiye should provide training and advisory support in policing, gendarmerie, intelligence, and border security. This would naturally tie Gagauzia’s security reflexes to Ankara.
After a declaration of independence, Türkiye should rapidly recognize Gagauzia, manage a chain-recognition process with Turkic states, and become the architect of the new state’s legitimacy. Economically, Türkiye-centered structures should be established in banking, energy, and investment. The emergence of an independent Turkish state in Europe would provide Türkiye with a strategic forward outpost along the Balkan-Black Sea axis. Due to both geopolitical interests and responsibilities arising from Turkish identity, Türkiye should not leave its kin to the EU-Russia rivalry and should strengthen its Black Sea position together with its kin.
The Impact of Gagauz Independence on Black Sea Security for Türkiye
Gagauzia’s independence would offer several benefits to Türkiye in terms of Black Sea security. First, it would create a friendly land-sea buffer aligned with Türkiye. An independent Gagauzia would give Türkiye a Turkish-identified, Ankara-aligned political actor in the western Black Sea basin. This would expand Türkiye’s maneuvering space within the Türkiye-NATO-Russia triangle and prevent the Romania-Ukraine axis from falling entirely under Western bloc control. It must be remembered that power in the Black Sea is not achieved solely through naval forces, but also through control of the hinterland.
Although Gagauzia has no direct access to the Black Sea, its location serves as a strategic lever. Its proximity to the Odesa-Budjak-Giurgiulești triangle and its position as the land key of the Danube-Dniester-Black Sea logistics corridor would provide Türkiye with indirect influence over ports, energy, grain, trade, and military logistics. In modern geopolitics, controlling the route to the sea-even without direct access-constitutes power.
Conclusion
Although the unification of Romania and Moldova has been attempted in the past and is widely debated today, there is no definitive certainty regarding its realization. Taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war to initiate efforts in this direction would be a rational move. In the event of unification, Gagauzia’s right to independence under the 1994 law holds significance not only for Gagauz Turks, but also for Türkiye and the broader Turkic world. Türkiye must fulfill its historical responsibility on this issue and begin preparations now, recognizing that even if unification remains rhetoric for the moment, the region may one day become independent.
