On Sunday, 28 December 2025, Iranian protesters filled the streets of Tehran to react against economic crisis-driven problems such as high inflation, rising unemployment rates, and the severe depreciation of the Iranian rial. The protests were led by merchants of the Tehran Grand Bazaar, who had also played a pioneering role in the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy. Within a short time, large crowds joined the demonstrations, including university students opposed to the regime and people from other cities. Soon after, the protests spread beyond Tehran, and many regions of the country were shaken by demonstrations. On the third day of the protests, the first deaths began to be reported as a result of the harsh intervention of security forces against protesters. By 31 December, the protests continued to grow across the country, and mass demonstrations and clashes with security forces occurred in the majority of cities. As violence escalated, the protests quickly intensified, and demonstrators began to demand the end of the regime and political change.
With the arrival of the new year, clashes between security forces and protesters increased in many provinces. Incidents such as the killing of two brothers in Kermanshah further fueled public anger and increased support for the protesters. In the following days, the regime cut internet and telephone connections, preventing information about the protests and the fate of protesters from reaching Iran and the international community. During this period, security forces increased the severity of their interventions and continued committing human rights violations. While the protests continued, the United Nations and human rights organizations reported numerous deaths-mostly civilians and widespread arbitrary arrests. Although the exact number of casualties has not been confirmed, figures ranging between four thousand and twelve thousand have been reported. Following this bloody suppression of protests, the US administration signaled support for the protesters and announced that it would impose an additional 25 percent customs tariff on countries trading with Iran. While this move led to a limited renewal of support among certain groups backing the regime, existing studies indicate that as economic conditions worsen further, the regime’s collapse becomes increasingly likely, given that it is primarily supported by Iran’s middle and lower economic classes. The purpose of this article is to examine what will happen to Iran if the regime collapses.
The Causes and Future of the Iran Protests
The initial cause of the protests was Iran’s severe economic difficulties. The sharp depreciation of the Iranian rial, high inflation, and the rising cost of living were the main factors triggering public anger. In later stages, the protests evolved into opposition against political repression and the regime itself. Some protesters targeted the structural authoritarian nature of the administration, demanding the end of the Islamic Republic and calling for the return of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah of Iran, to take power. Demands such as freedom of expression and the end of discrimination against women, combined with internet restrictions, further intensified the public’s reaction.
In order to understand the future of the protests and their potential impact, it is necessary to analyze the structure of the groups participating in them. The protests began at the Tehran Bazaar, the same location where the Iranian Revolution had started. This indicates the participation of middle-class elements such as shopkeepers, merchants, and traders. The Iranian clerical regime is sustained by two main pillars: the middle and lower classes. For this reason, the participation of certain segments of the middle class in the protests is significant for the future of the regime. The main group participating in the protests consists of university students and young people, who over time became the largest segment of the demonstrations. Since they did not experience the Shah period and did not witness its effects, and because they view Reza Pahlavi as the only political actor opposing the clerical regime, they demand the return of the monarchy. Another crucial group participating in the protests is workers and labor organizations. The active participation of workers-who represent the lower class and constitute one of the regime’s two main pillars-and their attempts to call for nationwide strikes clearly demonstrate the severity of the challenge faced by the regime.
As the protests continued and the regime attempted to suppress them violently, all those following the issue began to question the fate of these protests and the kind of change they might bring to Iran. The change in question is whether anti-regime protests will succeed in overthrowing the regime. The answer to this question is not easy. Although the middle and lower classes participated in the protests, the later shift of demonstrations toward explicit regime-change demands has allowed these two groups to withdraw from the streets. For this reason, it is not realistic to expect the protests to overthrow the regime. However, this does not mean that the regime will not collapse in the near future.
The Future of the Iranian Clerical Regime
There are many reasons why the theocratic regime in Iran and the political structure based on it have not collapsed to this day, despite low public support and belief. The most important of these reasons is the absence of any alternative force capable of holding Iran together if the regime collapses. Iran contains numerous ethnic groups, different languages, and regional identities. It is not easy for a country with such diversity to remain unified without an overarching structure. Following the Islamic Revolution, Shiism-an identity shared by approximately 90 percent of Iran’s population-was designated as the binding element, and the regime was built upon it. If we also consider that around 10 percent of Iran’s population is Sunni, the collapse of the regime would leave no remaining reason or identity capable of holding the country together. This situation suggests that the fragmentation of Iran would be inevitable. Such fragmentation would likely follow the ethnic distribution of Iran’s provinces. Achieving rapid results and establishing new regional statuses after fragmentation would not be easy. The existence of disputed regions with mixed ethnic distributions, the dominance of certain ethnic claims in various maps, and the shift of the center of Shiite identity from Iran to Iraq should not be overlooked.
Risks Facing Türkiye and Necessary Measures in the Event of Iran’s Fragmentation
If Iran were to fragment, Türkiye would face numerous risks. To properly identify these risks, it is appropriate to evaluate them within the triangle of security, economy, and migration. The first and most urgent leg of this triangle is security. The primary concerns include border security and the emergence of ungoverned spaces. Today, the Iranian state controls its side of the border. The weakening or disappearance of this control would increase the likelihood of militarization, illegal crossings, and the disruption of weapons and drug trafficking routes along the Zagros line. If fragmentation occurs in line with the maps promoted by existing Kurdish movements, Türkiye would find itself surrounded by a structure referred to as Iranian Kurdistan, even though it would border West Azerbaijan Province and despite the majority of the population in border cities being Azerbaijani Turks rather than Kurds. This would mean that PJAK could encircle Türkiye’s borders and pose a serious threat to Türkiye.
The second leg of the triangle is the economy. Türkiye maintains extensive trade relations with Iran. In the event of Iran’s fragmentation, land trade with Iran, transit routes, and the economies of border provinces would suffer. The resulting chaos could increase smuggling while reducing official trade. In addition, Iran is one of Türkiye’s natural gas suppliers. In a civil war or fragmentation scenario, supply disruptions and price increases could create inflationary pressure and strain Türkiye’s energy security. Energy infrastructure passing through Iran could also be affected.
The final leg of the risk triangle is migration. Due to the Syrian crisis, Türkiye is already in a sensitive position politically, socially, and in terms of capacity. A large migration wave from Iran would create sudden pressure on housing, healthcare, education, the labor market, and public order. This would also exacerbate tensions between Türkiye and the EU regarding buffer-zone policies.
To address these risks, Türkiye must begin preparing a roadmap and its infrastructure in advance. Within the framework of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach, border security should be commanded and coordinated through a single institutional structure and a unified operational picture. Technological capabilities should be fully utilized at the Iranian border, and crisis mode should be activated. In addition, customs and financial crime capacities must be expanded to combat smuggling, drugs, and arms trafficking in border provinces. Migration must be stopped at the border, and its spread within Türkiye must be prevented. In order to minimize economic problems before a potential crisis, dependence on Iranian gas should be reduced. Winter scenarios should be prepared against possible supply disruptions, and diversification steps should be taken in LNG contracts. To protect Turkish citizens trading with Iran, Türkiye should open new opportunities for the business community through new trade agreements and seek ways to minimize the impact on Turkish entrepreneurs.
The greatest threat to Türkiye is the realization of maps shared by PJAK and other Kurdish movements, which would result in Türkiye’s eastern borders being surrounded by terrorist groups. To prevent this scenario, Türkiye must pursue an active policy in the region and must not forget that its kin communities constitute the majority in certain areas. Türkiye can only achieve lasting security and turn the crisis into an opportunity by acting together with its kin communities. Therefore, Azerbaijani Turks and Turkmens within Iran must be supported materially and morally. Through this support, the formation of a dense Turkish presence from West Azerbaijan Province to Golestan Province should be targeted, and regions such as Gilan and Mazandaran-although not densely populated by Turks but geographically essential for continuity-should also be included. The establishment and strengthening of a state along this line would prevent terrorism targeting Türkiye originating from Iranian geography and would ensure the unity of Azerbaijani Turk and Turkmen settlements, enabling Türkiye’s access to Central Asia. For this reason, Türkiye must focus on the region and take all necessary steps without hesitation to ensure independence and strengthening in line with the objectives outlined above. This means turning a historic crisis into an opportunity. If these steps are not taken, Türkiye may face a scenario worse than what it experienced during the Syrian Civil War.
Conclusion
The protests in Iran, which began as a reaction to economic problems and later evolved into demands for regime change, are considered to be a harbinger of a process that may alter Iran’s future. It should not be forgotten that this transformation may create both risks and opportunities for Türkiye. Although the process initiated by the protests may not immediately change Iran’s structure, Türkiye must begin preparing now by considering the possibility that such a transformation could one day occur, in order to protect both its own interests and the security of its kin communities in the region.
