The Cyprus Dispute represents one of the major sources of tension between two of the major allies of the United States. During the most critical phase of this affair, Washington choose the safest road and avoided to take side. This action, aimed to preserve the harmony between its most important instrument for the containment of the Soviets, proven to be pivotal for the current status quo in the island.
The apple of discord
The Second World War represented the last direct conflict between major powers which resulted into a dramatic shift of the power distribution on the international system. Just two yers later, the two “superpowers” emerged from the war, the United States and the Soviet Union, embarked into a new competition dominated by indirect forms of conflict, rather than a kinetic war. This period of geopolitical tensions popularly known as “Cold War” saw the formation of multilateral alliances by the actors involved as an important foreign policy instrument. In particular, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, better known as “NATO”, represented the pillar of the American containment strategy against the Soviet Union. In this context, the first enlargement of this powerful alliance was directed toward the Eastern Mediterrean. Greece and Türkiye were in fact located into a strategic position highly functional to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to project its power across the Mediterrean Sea. Due to this state of affair, after an initial diffidence toward their entering among the members, both of them were admitted in the North Atlantic Alliance in 1952. However, the relations between the NATO newcomers were plagued by a bleeding wound, a dispute about Cyprus. This little island, still part of the dying British Empire, was inhabited by a Greek majority and a small Turkish community. The former advocated for an union with Greece, while the latter supported two different option: the continuation of the British colonial rule, or the partition of the island due to the fear of discrimination by the Greek population. The Island of Cyprus was regarded by the United States as a location of scarce relevance whose little importance was mostly related to the power projection toward the Middle East guaranteed by the British bases of Akhotiri and Dehelia.
Due to this state of affairs, the little and almost unimportant Island of Cyprus represented a major headache for the United States. The dispute between Greece and Türkiye constituted a bomb potentially capable to cause a fracture between two pivotal allies, so, the US policy toward this issue was based on two priorities: preserve the harmony between its allies and the ability to project the western power toward the Middle East through the bases of Akhotiri and Dehelia. So, Washington adopted a cautious posture voting against the starting of a discussion about the Cyprus dispute at the UN General Assembly. The American position immediately regarded as “pro Turkish” by Greece, a reaction which greatly angered the United States. In this complex situation, the Turkish government through the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes clarified its position about Cyprus. Ankara clearly stated that it could not accept the Enosis, due to its fears about discrimination about the Turkish community and the proximity of the Island to the Turkish mainland, which made it vulnerable to a possible Greek attack. Thanks to its strategic importance for the American foreign policy, the United States assumed a position aimed to protect the Turkish interests.
The American goals toward the Cyprus dispute were finally formulated in 1955. The US stated that they would have endorsed any solution in line with three clear priorities: avoiding clashes between NATO allies, ensure Turkish interests and preserve the British bases of Akhotiri and Dehelia. In particular, Washington intended to elect a Constituent Assembly aimed to edit a new constitution which would have paved the way for a plebiscite on the final status of the island after ten years. The Americans clearly stated that in the case of Enosis Greek armed forces would not have been allowed to be located on Cyprus except in the case of a NATO official request.
The modern day Helen
The latter part of the 50s saw the progressive worsening of the already damaged Turkish Greek relations. The island of Cyprus became a sort of Helen of Troy, the catalyst factor for a new war between the two side of the Aegean Sea. In 1958 the Greek personnel located in the NATO HQ in Izmir was evacuated toward an aerial bridge due to anti Greek disorders and Athens placed its forces along the Turkish border in a state of readiness. During this difficult period, the United States reiterated its position toward a solution aimed to preserve the harmony between Greece and Türkiye. The 1959 represented a turning point in the history of the American relations with Cyprus. This year was marked by the signing of the London and Zurich Agreements, which granted the independence of Cyprus from the United Kingdom. This treaty was followed the subsequent year by two other documents: the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. The first established a tripartite Headquarter on the island composed by Greek Turkish and British officials in order to train the Cypriot military. The second stated that the three parties committed themselves to preserve the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus. At the same time, the United Kingdom preserved its control of the bases of Akhotiri and Dehelia. The independence of Cyprus represented a re-edition of a common process during the Cold War, the progressive takeover of the United States of British managed issues. Since this moment the U.S replaced the UK the as the main mediator in the Cyprus dispute. Once again the United States adopted a moderate position, abstaining from directly providing military aid to the Cyprus military, leaving this role to Greece and Türkiye. Washington was aimed to preserve the status quo on the island, preventing the resurgence of violence between the Greek and Turkish community on the island and avoiding a possible communist takeover. Even before the effective independence of the island, the United States regarded the inherent factionalism within the Greek Cypriot community and the local powerful communist party, the AKEL, as a source of instability, while they regarded the Turkish Cypriot commmuntiy as more homogenous and disciplined.
The fragile status quo sharply deteriorated during the 60s. The attempt of the charismatic Cypriot President, the archbishop Makarios, to enact 13 amendments to the Cypriot constitution aimed to reduce the representation for the Turkish Cypriot promoted a wave of violence between the two communities. This conflict, popularly known as “Cypriot intercommunal violence”, further exacerbated the tensions between the two sides of the Aegean Sea. This violence resulted in the de facto loss of the effective control over the whole territory of the island by the Cyprus Government. The Turkish community formed fortified enclaves which were economically and military supported by Türkiye and administered as a de facto separated state. The peak of this period was represented by the so called Battle of Tillyria. The Cypriot National Guard attacked the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Kokkina with heav weapons, prompting a Turkish military Intervention. The Air Force of Ankara bombed the Greek Cypriot position preventing the fall of the enclave. Türkiye seriously considered the possibility of a full scale intervention, but President Lyndon Johnson wrote a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, asking to avoid a direct military intervention which would have caused a massive fracture between NATO allies during the peak phase of the Cold War.
The Trojan Horse
The latter part of the 60s saw the emergence of a new factor of tension, the high political instability of the mainland Greece. Already in 1964 rightist factions in the Greek armed forces attempted a coup d’etat aimed to suppress the leftist forces in the country. The United States regarded a possibile military coup in Greece as a catalyst for a direc war between Greece and Türkiye. In fact, the possibile formation of a Greek ultra nationalist military junta which would have probably tried to achieve the Enosis would have resulted into a direct Turkish military intervention. The American nightmares come true in 1967 when the Greek armed forces led by Georgios Papadopoulos overthrowned King Constantine II, establishing a military junta popularly known as “Colonel’s regime”. Washington immediately became concerned about the possibility of another military coup in Cyprus aimed to achieve the Enosis performed by a proper “Trojan Horse”, the Greek military officers highly presents in the Cypriot National Guard. The Colonel’s regime looked like a modern day Paris of Troy, this time located on the left side of te Aegean Sea, ready to kidnap Helen.
In 1967 the tension between the two communities in Cyprus erupted once again. The Cypriot National Guard, dominated by Greek officers, began to patrolling the Turkish enclaves of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. This clashes resulted in the death of 26 Turkish Cypriots. Once again the Turkish government seriously considered the possibility of a direct military intervention and gave an ultimatum to the Greek government. Ankara demanded the expulsion of Georgios Grivas, the founder of the EOKA Movement from Cyprus and the withdrawn of the 12.000 Greek troops in excess from the limits of the Treaty of Alliance. Only the Greek compliance to Turkish requested avoided a military confrontation, but it was only postponed. At the same time, the Turkish domestic political situation sharply deteriorated. In the latter part of the 60s Ankara was plagued by high political instability. Islamist and leftist groups started a massive campaign of mutual killing and terror. The government of Suleiman Demirel was increasingly perceived ad incapable of deal with these issues. In 1971, 11 years after their first coup d’etat, the Turkish Armed Forces forced Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to resign. Due to this state of affairs, the Turkish military greatly increased its influence over domestic policy, making the country more ready to enact a military intervention in Cyprus in the case of another eruption of intercommunal violence. At the same time, the Turkish government regarded the Cyprus status quo as unfavorable to its interests. The Turkish enclaves were not economically sustainable and the progressive reintegration of the Turkish communities in the Cyprus political life would have undoubtedly weakened them.
The kidnapping of Helen
After the 1967 crisis, the Archbishop Makarios gradually shifted away from the Enosis toward a more pragmatic approach aimed to preserve the island independence. In particular, he tried to reduce the Cypriot military dependence from Greece. He purchased a big amount of Czechoslovak weapons in order to form a paramilitary force as a counterbalance to the National Guard dominated by Greek officers and de facto controlled by Athens. The action of Makarios greatly angered thre Americans, which feared the increase of the soviet influence on the island. At the same time, General Grievas founded another paramilitary ultranationalist movement, the EOKA B, aimed to got the Enosis. Even though the soviet influence on Cyprus was growing, the progressive autonomy of Makarios encouraged the Turkish community to engage into a negotiation. Rauf Denktash, the head of the Turkish Cypriot community, released a document which summarized the “final” Turkish position. He demanded a separated administration for the Turkish Cypriot community and the complete renunciation of the Enosis.
The negotiations proven to be very difficult and at the same time, Grivas and the EOKA B continued to pursue their intent of overthrowing Makarios in order to realize the union with Greece. The chain of events started in 1973, when the pragmatic Greek junta that avoided a war with Ankara in 1967 was toppled by a more obscurantis one led by Phaedon Gizikis. This new military government immediately tried to take advantage of the Greek officers who dominated the Cyprus National Guard in order to take the control of the island. The situation reached the breaking point in 1974, when Athens ordered the overthrowing of Makarios. The coup d’etat resulted in a massive crackdown both against Makarios supporters and Turkish enclaves and the preparation of the island for the Enosis. The Greek Cypriot troops occupied the Turkish enclaves of Limassol and Lefka, over 3000 Turkish Cypriots were confined in prison camps. Exaclty as Paris kidnapped Helen prompting the Trojan War, Greece had tried to annex Cyprus prompting the Turkish military intervention. As the war was about to start, the United States assumed a de facto neutral posture. The Washington main goal was avoiding a collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO. Due to this state of affairs, the best possible outcome for the United States was a “strengthened” partition of Cyprus, which would have granted Türkiye’s interest and saved the Greek honor. On 20 July the Ankara government launched its military intervention in Cyprus. The Turkish armed forces quickly secured a bridgehead between the cities of Nicosia and Kyrenia. Due to the embarassing defeat in Cyprus, the Greek military junta quickly collapsed and was replaced by a new democratic government led to Konstantinos Karamanlis, who decided to not involve Greece in a direct confront with Türkiye.
The first Turkish military intervention was regarded as legal by the Council of Europe in Resolution 573, as per Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960. However, the situation was far from solved. The Turkish government demanded the formation of a federal government on the island and a population transfer in order to create two homogenous community. The failure of the negotiations led to the second Turkish intervention which started on 14 August 1974. This time, Türkiye captured nearly 40% of Cyprus. After the war, the fall of Cyprus in soviet hands was avoided, as well as the Enosis, a Greek civilian government aimed to preserve the Athens position in NATO was formed and Turkish interests were fulfilled, the best possibile outcome for the United States.
Conclusion
The Cyprus war of 1974 represented one of the conflicts caused by unresolved disputes which had their roots in the Ottoman Empire. This dispute resulted a complex paradox for the American foreign policy in the context of the Cold War. Even thoug the island of Cyprus got actually a scarce strategic importance, but its position as “apple of discord” between two key allies of the United States which played a key role in avoiding a direct soviet acess to the Mediterranean Sea was possible of causing a major damage for the American efforts of containment. Due to this state of affairs, Washington adopted a cautious posture, aimed to avoid any direct confrontation between Greece and Türkiye in order to preserve the stability of the Atlantic Alliance. This position was firstly enacted though a role of “mediator” between the two sides. In a second moment, it became a position of de facto neutrality, Washington avoided any direct involvement which could have inimicated one of the allies. In this case, the “inaction” of the United States resulted in the best possibile outcome for its interest in a critical moment of the Cold War.
