Connect with us

Hi, what are you looking for?

HariciyeHariciye

Genel

The EU’s Rearmament: From Peaceful Continent to Security Fortress? by Zafer Aydin

Introduction

The historic Alaska summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, often likened to the Yalta Conference, was followed by White House meetings in Washington between President Trump, Ukrainian President Zelensky, and European leaders, where the topics discussed in Alaska were likely conveyed to the Europeans. These talks have raised hopes of ending the Russia–Ukraine war that has been continuing since 2022. Even if peace is restored in Europe as a result of these negotiations, this war or conflict, however it is called, has already prompted the conception and implementation of policies that will profoundly reshape Europe’s and the West’s security architecture in the coming period.

Following the end of the Cold War, security and defense policies in Europe were long regarded as secondary in importance, while the continent’s future was envisioned through economic integration, the diffusion of normative values, and peaceful cooperation. The European Union’s (EU) discourse of “normative power” reflected the spirit of this era, and security spending perceived by many states as a debatable and even unnecessary public expenditure. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, more decisively, the war in Ukraine that began in 2022 triggered a fundamental rupture in Europe’s security perception. Today, Europe’s rearmament is debated not only as a military necessity but also as a political, economic, and technological necessity.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine in 2022 brought back long-postponed debates about the European security architecture to the center of the agenda. In particular, the concept of “strategic autonomy” is no longer seen as a theoretical aspiration but as a concrete strategic orientation that must be followed. In this regard, The European Union has published policy documents such as the White Paper on Defence and Readiness 2030, Rearm Europe, and the SAFE Program, aiming to strengthen its defense capacity and establish continental deterrence through joint funds and integration plans. Although this process faces financial constraints, institutional coordination challenges, and debates over political legitimacy, EU institutions are taking determined steps toward achieving the declared objectives.

Strategic Autonomy & The Ukraine War

The concept of “strategic autonomy,” which in fact dates back to 1998 in Europe’s security policies, has become an unavoidable agenda item with Russia’s attack on Ukraine. First introduced into official documents at the 2013 European Council summit of heads of state, Strategic Autonomy emphasizes the necessity for Europe’s defense industry to become more integrated, sustainable, innovative, and competitive.

The need for the EU to gain strategic autonomy in defense was also included in the “European Union Global Strategy” of June 2016. Although it reappeared during the Covid-19 pandemic with the aim of effectively combating a crisis that threatened public health, this concept gained significance particularly after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the limited deterrence shown by the U.S. and NATO in this conflict, and the realization that Europe must achieve self-sufficiency in deterrence.

In particular, Emmanuel Macron’s calls for Europe to become an independent actor capable of ensuring its own security have gained broader acceptance with the war. Nevertheless, differences in perception of the idea of autonomy exist among European countries. While Western Europe supports further integration and joint defense investments, Central and Eastern European states consider their national capacities insufficient and therefore continue to regard the deterrence of NATO and the U.S. as their primary guarantee.

At the same time, the war has clearly exposed the shortcomings of European armies in facing modern threats. The rapid depletion of stockpiles while providing ammunition support to Ukraine, deficiencies in air defense systems, and the difficulties in coordination due to different national standards of weaponry among the EU’s 27 member states have revealed serious vulnerabilities in the continent’s defense capacity. This situation demonstrates that not only political will but also a strong industrial and technological transformation is essential.

EU Plans and Integration

In response to the transformation of the security environment after the Ukraine war, a comprehensive rearmament process has been launched. At the heart of this effort are plans aimed at making member states’ fragmented and disorganized defense policies more coherent. In essence, this means extending the EU’s strong integration in other fields into the area of defense.

In this context, EU institutions are seeking to guide capacity building, investment, and integration in the defense sector through joint funds for defense expenditures and initiatives such as the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 and the Single Market for Defence.

Within this framework, in January 2025, European Defence Agency (EDA) Director Kaja Kallas announced the vision of a “Single Market for Defence.” This plan sets forth a vision to merge fragmented supply chains, reduce costs, ensure the interoperability of ammunition and equipment produced across all member states, build common weapons systems, and make Europe more competitive in the global defense industry.

White Paper on Defence and Rearm Europe Plan 2030, published in 2025 March, provides a framework for  the aim of building a deterrent, flexible, and autonomous defense architecture for the continent by 2030. This document outlines a roadmap for increasing defense investments, strengthening joint procurement mechanisms, and integrating military capacities.

Among all the plans long discussed theoretically and treated as a necessity, and among the various policy documents announced, Rearm Europe stands out as the most concrete step taken. Announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in March, this plan foresees the allocation of a total budget of $800 billion by EU member states over the next several years for defense spending without disrupting their fiscal balances. On the other hand, as part of the Rearm Europe plan, the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative foresees the provision of $150 billion in low-interest loans directly allocated to member states for use in joint defense purchases. In addition, under the SAFE program, member states will be able to invoke the “national escape clause” in order to exceed the EU’s budget deficit restrictions while increasing their defense expenditures.

At present, 16 of the EU’s 27 members have requested exemptions from the EU’s fiscal stability rules, while the costly nature of defense investments has caused public criticism that resources which could have been allocated to social spending, education, climate change, and environmental issues are instead being diverted to the military field. However, under current circumstances, the perception of threat from Russia, the aspiration to build an autonomous structure beyond the U.S. defense umbrella, and other threat perceptions highlighted in the White Paper—such as the rise of China, uncertainties in the Middle East and Africa—have pushed these debates into the background. As a result, security is no longer regarded as a “cost” for the EU, but as a “necessity.”

U.S.–EU–NATO Relations: Redefining the Transatlantic Balance

Europe’s rearmament process cannot be considered independently from its relations with NATO and the United States. Although the European Union has sought to develop its own vision of strategic autonomy through initiatives such as white papers and the SAFE program, NATO still constitutes the backbone of the security architecture. Nevertheless, during the process that began with Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the U.S. warnings for the EU to increase its defense spending were seen as signals that the security of the “old continent” could no longer be sustained solely under American guarantees.

In this context, the decisions taken at NATO’s most recent summit marked a critical turning point. At the summit, member states pledged to raise their defense expenditures to at least 5% of their gross domestic product by 2035. This decision will compel European states to make radical increases in their defense budgets. In addition, Europe’s plan to establish a €650 billion budget, its €150 billion joint procurement program, and its integration plans appear to be in harmony with NATO’s target. In this respect, the EU’s rearmament efforts are progressing in parallel with the alliance’s overall strategic objectives.

From the perspective of the United States, this process represents the fulfillment of its long-standing demand for “burden sharing.” Washington under the Trump administration had openly stated that it did not wish to take the responsibility of Europe’s security alone; it particularly emphasized the need for greater European initiative in Eastern Europe, where tensions with Russia were escalating. Amid these debates, scenarios such as “lonely Europe”—in which the U.S. might leave the old continent on its own—occasionally came to the fore. However, the EU’s assumption of greater responsibility is emerging as a likely outcome that could make the transatlantic alliance more balanced, resilient and stronger. In this regard, Germany’s permanent increase in its defense budget through Zeitenwende 2.0, France’s attempt to align its vision of strategic autonomy with the NATO framework, and other EU initiatives are being positively received in Washington.

NATO’s role in Eastern Europe is another issue that must be addressed in this process. For states such as the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania, where the Russian threat is felt most directly, NATO’s presence is a security guarantee. The deployment of additional forces to the alliance’s eastern flank under U.S. leadership, the strengthening of air defense systems, and the increase in joint exercises contribute to deterrence in the region. These developments demonstrate that, as the EU implements its own defense plans, it must remain in harmony with NATO. Otherwise, security on the eastern flank could be vulnerable.

Criticism and Challenges of the Rearmament Process

Europe’s rearmament process, although seen as a strategic necessity, is faced by challenges and criticisms. First, the issue of financing. The request by sixteen member states for exemption from budget stability rules in order to increase defense spending points to the need to choose between or find a balance between fiscal discipline and security needs. Rising military expenditures are in competition with social spending which is causing serious debates in the public sphere. Convincing the European public, which has lived with an anti-militarist culture for many years, to accept the allocation of budgets toward armament has also become a separate task.

Second, there are many issues in the integration process that need to be resolved both technically and politically. It is emphasized that the fact that European armies have different standards, weapon systems, and supply chains causes inefficieny in the mass production of ammunition and equipment on the continent. Although the SAFE program and the €150 billion purchase plan aim to reduce this inefficiency and fragmented structure, national interests emerge as another challenge that integration plans must overcome. While France seeks to preserve and advance the advantageous position of its defense industry, Eastern European countries demand quick and inexpensive solutions as they feel directly threatened due to their geographical proximity to Russia, These two different approaches stand as an issue to be overcome in order for the EU’s vision of a “single defense market” to materialize.

Third, the issue of political legitimacy. The goal of strategic autonomy is perceived in some countries as an attempt to distance themselves from the United States, and it is thought that this could weaken transatlantic ties. Therefore, if this entire process turns into a “Europe Alone” scenario without the US, concerns are voiced that Europe would face a major security risk both militarily and diplomatically. Furthermore, opinions are expressed that rearmament contradicts the EU’s value system, which underscores peaceful identity.

In this respect, although Europe’s rearmament is an unavoidable step toward increasing military capacity, it also comes with numerous criticisms in terms of budget, integration, political legitimacy, and values. These challenges emerge as important factors in determining the speed and scope of the process.

Conclusion

The rearmament process of Europe, accelerated by the war in Ukraine, signifies not only the construction of military capacity but also a political and economic transformation. The White Paper, Rearm Europe, SAFE, and Single Market for Defence plans and visions, which set out the political reasons, economic costs, and objectives of the EU’s armament, are important indicators that the continent is moving toward a more coordinated and stronger defense structure. Although these steps face challenges such as budget constraints, public reactions, and conflicts of national interest, it is understood at this point that the EU is determined to achieve its goal of self-defense.

In addition, the perception of threat from Russia and the burden-sharing demands of the United States, along with NATO’s decisions to raise the share of defense spending in budgets to 5%, are forcing Europe to advance on this path.

In conclusion, Europe, in the field of defense that it had previously regarded and propagated as a financial burden and unnecessary, has now launched a comprehensive process of investment, transformation, and integration in order to ensure the continent’s future security.

Bibliografy:

https://americangerman.institute/2025/04/germanys-zeitenwende-2-0-this-time-for-real/

https://www.touteleurope.eu/l-ue-dans-le-monde/qu-est-ce-que-l-autonomie-strategique-europeenne/

https://www.vie-publique.fr/questions-reponses/282035-lautonomie-strategique-europeenne-en-cinq-questions 

https://www.visionofhumanity.org/europes-military-awakening-and-the-real-challenge-of-defence-integration/  

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-european-defence-and-rearm-europe-planreadiness-2030-remarks-high-representativevice_en  

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/14/more-better-european-white-paper-maps-path-for-eu-rearmament 

https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2025/01/22/new-eda-head-kallas-calls-for-eu-single-market-for-defence 

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769566  

https://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/defense/plan-de-rearmement-europeen-de-quoi-ont-vrai

ment-besoin-les-armees-du-vieux-continent-47a51782-f83a-11ef-b38f-dff807deb5c8 

https://www.iris-france.org/en/the-rearm-europe-plan-squaring-the-circle-between-integration-and-national-sovereignty/ 

https://www.iris-france.org/le-programme-de-rearmement-safe-de-lue-et-ses-consequences-potentielles/ 

https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-bet-transform-defense-weakness-secret-weapon-growth/ 

https://cepa.org/article/europe-very-well-alone/ 

https://cepa.org/article/europes-5-pledge-must-buy-10-fold-edge/ 

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/05/01/rearmement-de-l-europe-seize-pays-

de-l-ue-demandent-d-etre-dispenses-des-regles-de-stabilite-budgetaire-pour-pouvoir-augmenter-leurs-depenses-militaires_6602051_3210.html 

https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/europe/rearmement-de-leurope-le-rapport-qui-sonne-lalarme-face-a-la-menace-russe-2171949 

 https://www.touteleurope.eu/l-ue-dans-le-monde/l-ue-adopte-un-programme-d-achats-de-150-milliards-d-euros-pour-son-rearmement/ 

https://ecfr.eu/publication/how-to-arm-a-pacifist-lessons-from-ukraine-for-the-eus-defence/https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/04/von-der-leyen-pitches-800bn-defence-package-ahead-of-eu-leaders-summit 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/qanda_25_790

Click to comment

Leave a Reply

E-posta adresiniz yayınlanmayacak. Gerekli alanlar * ile işaretlenmişlerdir

You May Also Like

Köşe Yazıları

Basra Körfezinin girişinde yer alan Abu Musa, Küçük ve Büyük Tund adaları 1971 yılında İran tarafından adaların ilhak edilmesinden itibaren günümüze kadar geçen sürede...

Köşe Yazıları

En sonda söylemek gerekeni en başta söyleyelim; Türkiye bu projeyi tamamlayacak, öngörülebilir gelecekte de tamamlamaktan başka bir seçeneğe sahip değil. Bu mecburiyetin gerekçeleri ayrı...

Köşe Yazıları

Yunanistan, önümüzdeki 6 yıl içerisinde sahip olacağı kabiliyetler sayesinde, olası bir çatışmanın 8. saatinde; Tüpraş ve Aliağa rafinerileri; Gölcük ve Aksaz donanma üsleri, Arifiye...

Köşe Yazıları

1949 yılında kuruluşunun hemen ardından İsrail’i resmen tanıyan ilk Müslüman ülkenin Türkiye olması, Tel Aviv ile Ankara arasındaki ilişkileri başından itibaren özel kılan önemli...